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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of the Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment dismissing the

Grynberg Parties' tort and contract claims for periods after July 1994, including the
following rulings:
A.

A non-final interlocutory order in another case as to when the

contracts terminated is a proper basis for a dismissal with prejudice of contract claims in
this case (preserved at R 2290, 2346, 2353-54, 2702, 2747, 2758-60);
B.

The economic loss doctrine precludes tort claims even after the

parties no longer had a contractual relationship (preserved at R2317-25, 2346, 2352-53,
2701,2747,2803);
C.

An absence of intent to grant third party beneficiary status can be

found without requiring Questar to produce the involved contracts for review and even
though Questar offered no evidence to support summary judgment but instead attacked
only the legal sufficiency of the pleading by seeking a more definite statement (preserved
at 2269, 2276, 2346-49, 2700-01, 2745).
D.

The Grynberg Parties failed to adequately plead the torts of

conversion and breach of fiduciary duty (preserved at R 2269, 2349-50, 2701-02, 232831).

1

II.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the one year savings clause in Utah

Code Ann. § 78-12-40 does not apply to this "case," including the Grynberg Parties' six
non-contract claims asserted with respect to periods both before and after the alleged July
1, 1994 termination of the Contracts (preserved at R 2268-74, 2307-13, 2325-28, 2331,
2336-43, 2703, 2748-49, 2760-61, 2803).
III.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the "economic loss" doctrine bars the

Grynberg Parties1 six non-contract claims, including claims for conversion, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty asserted with respect to periods
both before and after the alleged July 1, 1994 termination of the contracts (preserved at R
2274,2317-25,2803).
IV.

Did the trial court err in ruling that all the Grynberg Parties' contract claims

were untimely, including the following rulings:
A.

The six month savings statute in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3)

applies to a partial dismissal of claims rather than dismissal of the "action" (§ 70A-2725(3) and the relevant date is October 1, 1998 when the BTU "claims" were dismissed
without prejudice rather than March 20, 2000 when the court in Questar II dismissed the
action by entry of a final judgment (preserved at R 2268-74, 2307-13, 2325-28, 2331,
2336-43, 2703, 2748-49, 2760-61, 2803);
B.

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-119 a payment does not accrue

the statute of limitations anew because a written "acknowledgment" is also required
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despite the statute's disjunctive language ("[w]hen payment has been made . . . or a
written acknowledgment... or promise to pay . . . the time for commencing an action
runs from the date of such payment, acknowledgement or promise") (preserved at 2270,
2305-07, 2331-35, 2344, 2617, 2631-32, 2803); and
C.

The statute of limitation accrued at the time of production of the gas,

including for contract payments made by Questar in 2000 and 2001 of $7.1 million using
incorrect BTU measurements (preserved at R 2270-73, 2305-07, 2331-35, 2344, 235456,2617,2631-32,2803).
V.

Did the trial court correctly refuse to apply the equitable tolling doctrine

(preserved at R 2313-17).
VI.

Did the trial court correctly rule that under Contract 219 the Grynberg

Parties have not raised genuine issues of material fact (preserved at R 2269, 2345-46,
2702-03,2745-46,2758-59)?
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on each of the above issues is
reviewed for correctness. See Price Development Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26, % 9,
995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon
for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or
upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing the same shall
3

have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within
one year after the reversal or failure.
B.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-119:
When payment has been made upon any demand founded on
contract or a written acknowledgment thereof, or promise to pay the
same has been made and signed by the party to be charged, the time
for commencing an action runs from the date of such payment,
acknowledgment or promise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings
Jack J. Grynberg, Celeste C. Grynberg and L&R Exploration ("Plaintiffs" or the

"Grynberg Parties") own working interests in gas wells located in the Nitchie Gulch
Fields of Wyoming. They have sold their gas to Questar Pipeline Company ("QPC") and
its affiliates (collectively "Defendants" or "Questar") for many years. Questar is charged
with measuring the volume and analyzing the heating content of the gas expressed in
BTUs, so that the Grynberg Parties and others can be fairly paid for the value of gas they
produced. Unknown until 1993 to the Grynberg Parties, Questar engaged in a scheme to
systematically shortchange the owners of gas production by designing its pipeline,
equipment, sampling devices and procedures in a way that would underreport the true
heating content of the gas Questar bought. Questar uses a different, more reliable
analysis when it sells the gas. The Grynberg Parties raised issues concerning the BTU
analysis in 1993 in a then pending lawsuit referred to as Questar II Among other things
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the Grynberg Parties' Amended Counterclaim in Questar II alleged that Questar "paid for
gas purchased from the Defendants using incorrect BTU adjustments." The parties
engaged in discovery and designated exhibits and witnesses on this and on other issues
surrounding the price and quantity of gas sold.
Although the BTU claims were directly related to the other claims in Questar II,
the BTU claims were not tried because Questar asked Judge Johnson, the Wyoming
federal district judge presiding over Questar II, to prevent it. Questar filed a motion in
limine in which it sought to exclude evidence concerning the BTU claims and it also
sought an order precluding the Grynberg Parties from ever bringing the BTU claims.
Judge Johnson denied Questar's requests and announced that he would dismiss these
claims without prejudice so that they could be separately litigated.
Thereafter, on March 22, 1994, the jury awarded a multi-million dollar verdict
against Questar. Four and one-half years later, Judge Johnson entered a Partial Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict. The Grynberg Parties successfully appealed the JNOV to
the Tenth Circuit and Questar paid the Grynberg Parties more than $5.1 million in March
2000 without reservation of any rights while acknowledging that Mr. Grynberg claimed
that more money was owed. Thereafter, Questar paid additional amounts to bring the
total payments in 2000 and 2001 to over $7.1 million related to purchases from the
Nitchie Gulch wells. The payments for gas included in this $7.1 million were based on a
formula: price, multiplied by volume, multiplied by a BTU adjustment. In making these
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payments, Questar used the same incorrect BTU adjustments of which the Grynberg
Parties complained in Questar II.
On October 1, 1998, Judge Johnson finally entered a written order on the BTU
claims dismissing them "without prejudice." Within one year thereafter, on September
29, 1999, the Grynberg Parties filed this action to resolve the dismissed BTU claims. On
March 20, 2000 the district court entered a final judgment in Questar II.
On July 6,2000 Questar filed a motion to dismiss the Grynberg Parties1 Amended
Complaint. In support of its motion, Questar attacked claims based upon alleged
insufficiency of certain pleadings but with respect to other claims Questar relied upon
exhibits. On March 8, 2001 the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision (R 2674-84)
(Addendum Ex. A) granting Questar's motion, treating Questar's motion as one for
summary judgment. The trial court denied the Grynberg Parties' request for any
discovery, finding that "additional discovery would [not] be of assistance, particularly
where the core issues are centered around the statute of limitations and legal principles of
the economic loss doctrine.11 Although the trial court refused "additional" discovery, in
actuality the trial court allowed no discovery since Questar filed objections and refused
to respond to any of the discovery previously served. Thereafter, on August 6, 2001 the
trial court entered its Order Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants ("S.J. Order")
(R 2784-91) (Addendum Ex. B). The Order was prepared by Questar and contained
significant rulings not contained in the Memorandum Decision.
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II.

Statement of Facts
1.

The Grynberg Parties and QPC and/or its predecessors are and have been at

all relevant times, parties to four (4) contracts for the purchase and sale of natural gas,
identified as Gas Purchase Agreements 245, 246 and 249 from lands and leases located
within the state of Wyoming (the "Contracts") and Gas Purchase Agreement 219 located
in the state of Colorado (the "219 Contract"). See (R 1496-15; 1518-67) Addendum Exs.
C-F. The Grynberg Parties have also been selling gas to Defendants, their predecessors
or affiliates and Defendants have been measuring the volume, analyzing the heating
content, gathering the gas, separating gas liquids and transporting gas production owned
by the Grynberg Parties under Defendants' direct contracts with the Grynberg Parties and
under contracts with Hunt Oil Company (the "Hunt Contracts"). Hunt Oil Company
("Hunt") is the operator of the wells that produce gas sold pursuant to the Contracts and
is authorized by virtue of the operating agreement to sell the Grynberg Parties' gas
production for the Grynberg Parties' benefit. Affidavit of Jack J. Grynberg ("Grynberg
Aff") (R 2358-59); Amended Complaint ^ 9 (R 771-853) (Addendum Ex. G).
2.

Defendants' gathering system is the exclusive method by which the

Grynberg Parties' gas production economically can be gathered and transported to an
interstate pipeline. The gas gathering from the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field is exclusively
tied into Questar Pipeline's transportation system. As part of the gathering process QPC
and Questar Gas Management Company ("QGMC") measure the volume and analyze the
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heating content of the gas entering Defendants1 gathering lines. Payment from
Defendants, or from any other purchaser, is based on the measured volume of gas,
expressed in MCFs multiplied by the heating content, expressed in BTUs of the gas and
multiplied by the price per MMBTU. Errors, whether innocent or deliberate, in the
volumetric measurement and in the BTU value analysis of the gas can and do
significantly effect the ultimate price paid to the owner of the gas. Grynberg Aff. (R
2353-54); Amended Complaint f 11 (R 773-74).
3.

Questar Energy Trading Company ("QETC") is an affiliate of QPC and

QGMC. At some time after QPC purported to unilaterally terminate the Contracts,
QETC purchased the gas produced from the Grynberg Parties' wells. QETC contracted
with Hunt, the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field operator, to purchase the same knowing of the
Grynberg Parties1 interest in the gas and proceeds of the gas. QETC knew or should have
known of the mismeasurement and wrongful analysis of the heating content of the gas in
which its affiliates were engaged. During the period of time QETC bought the Grynberg

Parties' gas production it was the beneficiary of the mismeasurement and wrongful
heating content analysis schemes in which it and its affiliates engaged and has been
unjustly enriched as a result of those schemes. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended
Complaint 113 (R 774).
4.

QPC sued the Grynberg Parties for declaratory judgment in the United

States District Court for the District of Wyoming in an action titled Questar Pipeline
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Company v. Grynberg, et al.9 Civil No. 92-CV-265J (herein "Questar IF). The
Grynberg Parties, counterclaimed, alleging among other things that QPC had breached
the Contracts because it under reported the volume of gas, paid the wrong price and in an
Amended Counterclaim based on recent discoveries alleged that Questar "paid for gas
purchased from the [Grynberg Parties] using incorrect BTU adjustments." See
Defendants' Addendum of Exhibits in Support of Motion to Dismiss (hereafter "Q. Ex."),
Ex. 13 (R 1603-12) (included in Addendum Ex. H), Questar II Amended Counterclaim,
114 (R 1605); Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint f 14 (R 775).
5.

The Grynberg Parties sought damages from Questar "in an amount equal to

the difference between the price provided by the agreements and the price actually paid
by the Defendants." Questar II Amended Counterclaim, Prayer Tfl (Q. Ex. 13) (R 1609).
Under the Contracts Questar is required to send "a statement showing the amount of gas
received by Buyer during the preceding calendar month, and payment shall be made
therefor by Buyer within ten (10) days after the rendering of any such statement;... Any
errors in such statement or payment shall be promptly reported to [Questar], and
[Questar] shall make proper adjustment thereof within thirty (30) days after final
determination of the correct volume or values involved." (emphasis added). Q. Exs. 4,
5 and 6 (R 1518-67) (Addendum Exs. D, E and F).
6.

At least since the filing of the amended complaint in Questar //the parties

have had a dispute as to whether Questar used the correct BTU adjustment. The correct
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BTU adjustment is both necessary and mandatory to determine the correct price paid
under the Contracts during all periods of time for gas produced from all wells. A correct
payment, including the over $7.1 million paid by Defendants in 2000 and 2001 for gas
cannot be made until there has been a final determination of the correct BTU adjustment.
Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint ^ 20 (R 776-77); Supplementation of
the Record (R 2616-23); see also infra \\6.
7.

Although the full extent of Questar's failure to correctly analyze and

determine the BTU adjustment was not known at the time the Amended Counterclaim in
Questar //was filed, the Grynberg Parties' understanding of Questar's action grew as the
case progressed and Mr. Grynberg and representatives of Questar had substantial
exchanges of information and meetings concerning the correct BTU adjustment before
trial. See Q. Ex. 23 (R 1677-98); Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54).
8.

Questar complained that the BTU claim it previously had understood to be

a $6,000 claim had become a multi-million dollar claim because, as Questar understood,
the determination of the correct BTU adjustment "rippled through" all of the Grynberg
Parties' damage calculations because all amounts paid under these Contracts are based
upon a determination of a correct BTU adjustment for all of the gas produced. All the
discussions and meetings between Grynberg and Questar dealt at all times with all gas
wells under the Contracts and all gas produced from them. Id.
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9.

The morning before the trial started the court announced that it would

bifurcate the BTU claims. The court's oral announcement made clear that it was denying
Questar's Motion in Limine in which Questar had sought to preclude the Grynberg
Parties from introducing evidence concerning the BTU adjustment and was denying
Questar's request for an order precluding the Grynberg Parties from ever again bringing a
claim concerning the BTU adjustment. Instead the court granted the Grynberg Parties'
request that they be allowed to bring their claims concerning the determination of the
correct BTU adjustment in a separate proceeding. See Transcript of Trial Proceedings, p.
14 (Q. Ex. 8) (R 1575-78) (Addendum Ex. I).
10.

Although the court orally announced that it would dismiss the BTU claims

without prejudice on February 28, 1994, the court did not enter a written order to that
effect until October 1, 1998. Although Questar represented to the trial court in this case
that Judge Johnson had granted its motion in limine, that assertion is incorrect. Shortly
after trial Questar and Grynberg submitted proposed forms of judgment both of which
indicated that the BTU claims had been dismissed without prejudice.
Specifically, Questar's own proposed form of judgment stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the Defendants' claim against the Plaintiff for paying for gas using
incorrect btu adjustments is dismissed without prejudice.
See Ex. 2 to Grynberg Parties' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (hereinafter "Grynberg Ex.") at If 9 (R 2360-65) (Addendum Ex. J).
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11.

The jury returned a verdict in Questar II in favor of the Grynberg Parties

on March 22, 1994. The court did not enter judgment on the jury verdict until June
1998. After the court substantially reduced the jury award, the Grynberg Parties filed a
Motion for Direction of Entry of Final Judgment Under Rule 54(b) so that they could
finally pursue an appeal of the issues tried in Questar II and obtain the written order of
dismissal without prejudice of the BTU claims. See Grynberg Ex. 2 (R 2360-65)
(Addendum Ex. J).
12.

Questar's response to Defendants1 motion under Rule 54(b) recited that

Questar "generally concurs in defendants' motion requesting the Court to direct the entry
of final judgment as to all claims resolved by the 1993 Judgment, the 1994 Order and the
1998 Judgment." See Grynberg Ex. 3 (R 2366-69) (Addendum Ex. K). Questar took
issue with the proposed treatment of the claims under Contract No. 219 and 563 and
claimed that they should be dismissed for failure to prosecute., however, Questar
concurred in the dismissal without prejudice of the BTU claims. Id.
13.

On October 1, 1998 the court in Questar II finally issued an order

regarding the BTU issue, dismissing the BTU claims without prejudice.
Additionally, to the extent it is required, in accordance with prior
rulings of this Court relative to defendants' claim against plaintiff for
paying for gas using incorrect BTU adjustments (the BTU claims),
the BTU claims have been DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, (emphasis in original)
Q. Ex. 24 at p. 2 (R 1699-1706) (Addendum Ex. L).
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14.

Although Questar had argued that the BTU claims the court dismissed were

not included in the pleadings and sought a preclusive order, that motion was denied and
as of October 1998 those claims were dismissed "without prejudice." Id. This case was
filed within one year thereafter on September 29, 1999 (R 1-23).
15.

After Judge Johnson granted a Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict and an appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the jury verdict was substantially reinstated.
See QPC Co. v. Grynberg, 201 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2000) (Addendum Ex. M). On
March 20, 2000, the trial court entered Judgment Following Remand to District Court
After Appeal ("]Questar //Final Judgment"). See Grynberg Ex. 4 (R 2370-73)
(Addendum Ex. N). The Questar II Final Judgment determined the price to be paid per
MMBTU (which is volume multiplied by BTU value) under the Contracts and
determined the amount owing for gas QPC was obligated to take but for which it had not
either taken or paid under the Contracts. The court also dismissed some of the Grynberg
Parties1 claims against QPC including the claim that it had stolen volumes of gas through
bypassing gas meters. Id.
16.

On March 16, 2000, QPC delivered to the Grynberg Parties1 counsel its

check in the amount of $5,146,071.56. The delivery of the check on the account was
"without any restrictions, limitations or reservation of rights" and Questar acknowledged
that the Grynberg Parties claimed they were owed additional amounts but nonetheless
requested that "Mr. Grynberg accept the enclosed check for the amounts everyone agrees
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upon while we continue to try to resolve differences on other amounts." See Grynberg
Ex. 5 (R 2374-79) (Addendum Ex. O); Amended Complaint % 17 (R 776). Questar paid
additional amounts in 2000 and 2001 for gas produced from the wells, including
$106,441 on August 1,2000 (for compression reimbursement), $524,400.51 on October
2, 2000 and $128,677.42 on January 5, 2001 (for tax reimbursements) for a total of
$5,905,590.49. See Amended Complaint If 17 (R 776); Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54);
Grynberg Ex. 6 (R 2380-82) (Addendum Ex. P); Exhibit A to Supplementation of The
Record (R 2620-23) (Addendum Ex. Q). Subsequent to the court's Memorandum
Decision in this lawsuit, Questar Gas Company made four additional payments totaling
$1,260,795.53. See Addendum Ex. R. In total Questar has made payments in 2000 and
2001 of over $7.1 million for gas produced from the wells using an incorrect BTU
adjustment. Id.
17.

The March 16, 2000 and later payments were based upon volumes of gas

and price as determined by the court. There has been no court or other final
determination of the BTU adjustment factor to be applied to the delivered gas volumes.
The parties have not agreed on the BTU adjustment factor to be used in the $7.1 million
payments or in any earlier payments. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint f
18 (R 776).
18.

During the four and one-half years between the time the jury returned its

verdict in favor of the Grynberg Parties and Judge Johnson's ruling on Questarfs Motion
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for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the parties continued discussions and
meetings on the determination of the correct BTU adjustment. See, e.g., the March 31,
1995 letter from Questar to the Grynberg Parties' Wyoming attorney, Mr. Toner.
Grynberg Ex. 7 (R 2383) (Addendum Ex. S). This letter provides:
Al Walker and Jack Grynberg have had several conversations
concerning Mr. Grynbergfs views about the testing and
measuring of the BTU content of gas that is brought into QPC
Company's system. Mr. Grynberg has indicated that he believes he
has a basis for filing an action on behalf of the United States based
on the provisions of the federal False Claims Act. Before doing so,
he has offered to resolve the matter through a settlement that he has
outlined to Mr. Walker.
* * *

At the present time, we do not have a basis for making a definitive
response to Mr. Grynbergfs settlement proposal. Before making a
final response, it would be helpful if we could obtain a more
complete description and explanation of the scientific basis for Mr.
Grynberg's claims, (emphasis added)
Id.
19.

Under the Contracts, QPC is to pay the Grynberg Parties based on three

factors: First, for the volume of gas delivered. Second, a determinable price per cubic
foot of gas, and third, the price is adjusted by the heating content expressed in BTU of
the delivered gas. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint If 19 (R 776).
20.

As reflected in the Questar //Final Judgment, the correct volumes, at least

with regard to the take or pay issue and the stolen gas claims, and price have now been
determined by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the correct and necessary
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BTU adjustment has not been determined. In addition, the date the Contracts terminated,
if at all, which determines the price and Questarfs "take obligation" is presently the
subject of litigation between the parties in the United States District Court for the District
of Wyoming ("Questar IIF). That question will be finally determined in Questar III or
in an appeal of Questar III. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint ^j 21 (R
777).
21.

After QPC purported to terminate the Contracts the Grynberg Parties

contracted with Hunt, and Hunt contracted with QPC and/or its affiliates to gather,
measure, analyze, purchase and transport the gas produced from the lands covered by the
Contracts. Upon information and belief these purchase Contracts extended at least
through November 1997, but gas gathering and transportation arrangements remain in
effect because there is no alternative. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint
^J22(R777).
22.

Either by the Contracts, the Hunt Contracts or otherwise, Questar

undertook to gather, measure, analyze the heating content and transport the gas owned by
the Grynberg Parties or for which the Grynberg Parties would be paid based upon
volume measurements and analysis of the heating content expressed in BTUs performed
by Questar. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint \ 23 (R 778).
23.

Questarfs standard Gas Gathering Agreements obligate the operator to

warrant that it "owns or otherwise controls supplies of gas that it wishes to have
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gathered." The operator also promises "to make settlement for all royalties due and
payments owed to Shipper's mineral and royalty owners" based on the measurements
determined as specified in the Gas Gathering Agreement. Based upon information and
belief, the Hunt Contracts contain provisions of similar effect. See Grynberg Ex. 8 at p.
9,1f 9 (R 2384-93) (Addendum Ex. T); Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint
HI 24-25 (R 778).
24.

The Grynberg Parties as mineral and royalty owners are intended

beneficiaries of the Hunt Contracts including any gas gathering or transportation
agreements between Hunt and Defendants. Id.
25.

Defendants at all times knew or should have known that Hunt would pay

the Grynberg Parties based upon the volume in MMCF measurements together with the
heating content expressed in BTUs they supplied to Hunt. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54);
Amended Complaint ^ 26 (R 778).
26.

QPC and/or Questar Gathering at all relevant times have been purchasing,

gathering, measuring, analyzing the heating content or transporting natural gas from the
lands and wells that are subject to the Contracts and the Hunt Contracts. In connection
with their pipeline or gathering systems Defendants measured the volume and analyzed
the heating content of the natural gas production from all the wells delivering gas under
the Contracts and the Hunt Contracts. During such time Defendants have been
improperly and incorrectly determining the heating content, expressed in BTUs, of the
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natural gas production from all such wells. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended
Complaint f 30 (R 779).
27.

A spot check analysis of the filings with the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission ("FERC") indicates that at various times since 1989 Defendant QPC has
reported that it sold more gas than it purchased. QPC reported that it actually gained gas
on the way from the well to the final destination, a physical impossibility since gas is
inevitably lost between the well and the destination by leakage, use by the pipeline
company to power the pipeline compressors and from shrinkage. These reports are false,
and illustrate that natural gas is consistently and knowingly undermeasured and
undervalued at the wellhead. Amended Complaint ^ 34 (R 780-81).
28.

The process of analyzing the heating content of natural gas is highly

technical. It requires special equipment, trained personnel to operate it without
manipulation, and proper laboratory conditions to obtain accurate results. Without
knowledge, and in reasonable reliance on the Defendants, the Grynberg Parties were
defrauded by Defendants who unjustly enriched themselves or their affiliates by
knowingly under reporting, at the point of purchase or input into a gathering line and/or
pipeline, the heating content of natural gas produced. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54);
Amended Complaint f 35 (R 781).
29.

Defendants periodically submitted statements to the Grynberg Parties

reporting the volume in MMCF and the heating content expressed in BTUs of the gas the
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Grynberg Parties produced and for which they were entitled to be paid the correct
amount. Defendants reported heating content in BTUs of gas produced from wells in the
Nitchie Gulch Gas Field that varied from 1,034 to 1,248 BTUs per MCF. This
constitutes an approximate 20% difference in heating content value which would result
in an approximate 20% difference in payments. Grynberg Ex. 9 (R 2394-2429)
(included in Addendum Ex. G~Amended Complaint) are graphs of the heating content
of the gas produced from the Grynberg Parties' wells as reported by QPC. The
unexplained differences in heating content expressed in BTUs were presented as normal
variations in the field that did not provide any basis for further inquiry or alarm. In fact,
Defendants knew or should have known that the heating content of the gas in the field
should have been roughly consistent within the field and over time. For the Dakota
formation gas production, the heating content should have been approximately 1,248
BTUs. For the Frontier formation gas production the heating content should have been
1,273 BTUs. These variations should have alerted Defendants, who were in a superior
position to know the significance of these variations, that there were problems with
Defendants' measurement and analysis of the heating content expressed in BTUs.
Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaint If 63 (R 795-96).
30.

In 1993 Plaintiff Jack Grynberg discovered pipe bypasses that he believed

enabled Questar to receive gas that did not pass through its respective gas meters and for
which Questar did not pay. Upon discovering that Questar unilaterally and without
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anyone's knowledge had installed ten (10) meter bypass devices Grynberg conducted his
own independent investigation and requested information from Questar about its
measurements. In Questar II, the Grynberg Parties requested that Questar produce
monthly information from its gas Master meter, which is the meter that measures all of
the gas gathered from the field. Except for line loss, the reading at the gas Master meter
should equal the sum of the individual and separate gas meter readings from each of the
particular wells in which the Grynberg Parties had an interest. The gas Master meter
reading cannot properly record a greater quantity of gas than the sum of the individual
wells delivering gas into the line and through the gas Master meter. Grynberg Aff. (R
2353-54); Amended Complaint ^ 65 (R 796).
31.

QPC resisted producing information from the Master meter for eight (8)

months. Finally, after a court order, Questar produced volume reports from its Master
meter showing that the volume at the Master meter was as much as 12% per month
greater than the sum of the volumes reported by individual meters from all of the feeder
lines. This physical impossibility further demonstrated that Defendants' measurements
were wrong and that they were underreporting and underpaying the Grynberg Parties for
their gas production and that Questar knew about it. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54);
Amended Complaint ^ 66 (R 796-97).
32.

QPC at all times has had sole control of the placement of measuring

devices, extraction of gas samples, positioning of the extraction points, custody of gas
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samples and analysis of gas samples. It maintains records of such information. QPC
produces only information on the results of its analyses and has vigorously resisted
attempts to obtain more specific information about its mismeasurements and analysis.
Without the whole scheme the individual techniques could not be effectively evaluated
and challenged by the Grynberg Parties. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended
Complaint^} 69 (R797-98).
33.

In the period beginning sometime in 1996 and thereafter, QPC became a

transportation company only. QPC operates the pipeline connected to the gathering lines
into which the Nitchie Gulch gas production is delivered. QPC previously operated the
gathering system as well as the pipeline and wrongly analyzed the heating content of the
gas that the Grynberg Parties delivered into the pipeline. QGMC continued and
continues QPCs wrongful practices in its operation of the gathering system and in its
wrongful analysis of the heating content of the gas the Grynberg Parties delivered into
the pipeline system. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54); Amended Complaintfflf10-11 (R 77374).
34.

In 1996, QPC turned over the gathering system to its affiliate, QGMC, but

QPC continued to measure gas and analyze it for heating content at the exit point of its
pipeline. Rather than use the inaccurate and unrepresentative techniques described in
paragraphs 36-62 of the Grynberg Parties1 First Amended Complaint, at the exit point of
the pipeline, QPC analyzes the heating content of the gas using a calorimeter-a process
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in which the gas is actually burned and the total heating content is accurately determined
for its own benefit and for the benefit of its affiliates. Grynberg Aff. (R 2353-54);
Amended Complaintffif32-62 (R 781-95).
35.

Notwithstanding that QPC at all times has had the capability of determining

the correct heating content and knows the correct heating content of the gas it transports,
QPC does not disclose the accurately determined heating content to sellers, such as the
Grynberg Parties, and assists its affiliates in carrying out the scheme to wrongly analyze
and keep from sellers the actual heating content of the gas delivered to QPC. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On March 8, 2001 the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision in which the
court made two sweeping legal conclusions that supposedly justify summary judgment
and a dismissal with prejudice of all the Grynberg Parties' claims over the entire time
frame embraced by this lawsuit. These legal conclusions are that the "contractual claims
are time-barred as a matter of law" and that the "economic loss doctrine bars the
plaintiffs' tort claims." Memorandum Decision at 8-9.
This decision to grant summary judgment and dismiss the Grynberg Parties' entire
lawsuit with prejudice had to surprise even Questar since its motion attacked only the
legal sufficiency of the pleading as to many claims (including a request for a more
definite statement); Questar acknowledged that the Grynberg Parties' tort claims are
timely at least as to production after September 29, 1995 and September 29, 1996
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(depending upon the claim); and Questar argued certain claims must be brought in a
different forum. See Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint ("Defendants' Opening Memo") at 53-71 (arguing the legal sufficiency of
certain claims and advocating resolution before FERC), and 87 (acknowledging
timeliness); Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint ("Defendants' Reply") at 48 ("claims
arising after the termination of the contract in July 1994 should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim . . . or on the ground of preemption").
Upon receiving the trial court's erroneous summary judgment, Questar attempted
to "fill the holes" in the trial court's logic by preparing an order that goes far beyond the
Memorandum Decision and contains unquestionable legal errors. The trial court's errors,
however, do not end with the holes Questar tried to plug by drafting an overly broad
order. The trial court committed error as follows:
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED ALL OF THE
GRYNBERG PARTIES' POST-JULY 1,1994 CLAIMS WITH
PREJUDICE.
The only basis for the trial court's dismissal of contract claims related to the time

period four years prior to the filing of this Complaint is the conclusion that the Contracts
terminated on July 1, 1994, as found by Judge Johnson in a related case {Questar III).
By giving Judge Johnson's interlocutory order preclusive effect, the trial court committed
clear error. In addition, to the extent Judge Johnson's date of termination turns out to be
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correct, the economic loss doctrine relied upon by the trial court to dismiss the Grynberg
Parties' tort claims, by definition, does not apply after July 1, 1994. The trial court erred
in applying that doctrine to all tort claims for all periods.
The trial court also erred in issuing alternative rulings that the Grynberg Parties
failed to plead claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and third party beneficiary.
With respect to conversion, the Grynberg Parties had title to the gas sold as verified in
the Amended Complaint and by affidavit. Questar's contrary factual claim is absolutely
false. The Grynberg Parties also adequately pled breach of fiduciary duty and third party
beneficiary status.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO APPLY THE ONE
YEAR SAVINGS STATUTE IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-40 TO THE
GRYNBERG PARTIES' TORT CLAIMS.
The trial court committed error in failing to give the one year savings statute

contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 any application to "this case.,f Instead, the trial
Court held that the UCC savings provision contained in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725
applies to "this case." In reality, the UCC savings statute unquestionably has no
application to the Grynberg Parties1 tort claims. The UCC provision also cannot apply to
periods after the parties no longer had a contractual relationship, alleged by Questar to
have occurred on July 1, 1994.
Further, under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) analysis that is applied for purposes of the
savings statute, the Grynberg Parties alleged the same conduct, transaction or occurrence
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in Questar //that serves as the basis for its claims here. The Grynberg Parties expressly
amended their counterclaim in Questar II to allege that Questar "paid for gas purchased
from [the Grynberg Parties] using incorrect BTU adjustments." The Grynberg Parties
were not required to plead the same legal theories in Questar II, nor are they precluded
from asserting additional and more specific allegations here. Lastly, Judge Johnson
never found that the BTU claims had not been pled in Questar II and all arguments to the
contrary conflict with the Amended Counterclaim, Judge Johnson's express written
orders in Questar II and admissions by Questar.

III. THE GRYNBERG PARTIES' TORT CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE
CONTRACTS.
The district court gave the economic loss doctrine an expansive and unwarranted
interpretation. Under Wyoming and Colorado law, the economic loss rule does not bar
intentional claims. Second, the negligent misrepresentation claim is not based upon
contractual duty, but upon the independent common law duty requiring a party to
exercise reasonable care or confidence in obtaining or communicating information on
which others rely. Finally, the negligent claim arises from Questar's enhanced duties as a
common carrier and as the party in control of measurement operations. Accordingly all
of the tort claims are independent of the contract claims and not barred by the economic
loss rule.
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IV.

THE GRYNBERG PARTIES' CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE TIMELY.
The Grynberg Parties' contract claims are unquestionably timely for all periods

four years prior to commencement of this lawsuit. The contract claims for all periods are
also timely for three additional reasons. First, the six month savings statute in Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-725(3) does not "trump" Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 and in all events the
six month period began on March 20, 2000, the date of the final judgment in Questar II.
Second, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-119 accrues the statute of limitations anew based upon
Questar's recent payments. Third, the statute of limitations did not accrue for contract
payments of $7.1 million made in 2000 and 2001 using incorrect BTU analyses until
those payments were made.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS EQUITABLE
TOLLING.
The trial court erred by failing to address equitable tolling. All factors necessary

for application of that doctrine are present.
VL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE CONTRACT 219.
The trial court also erred in granting summary judgment on the Contract 219

claim. Questar presented no evidence on the allegations of fraudulent inducement and
consequently the court had no basis to grant summary judgment. Further, the trial court
erred in failing to allow the Grynberg Parties to conduct discovery before granting
summary judgment.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED ALL OF THE
GRYNBERG PARTIES' POST-JULY 1,1994 CLAIMS WITH
PREJUDICE.
A,

The Grynberg Parties Either Have a Contract Claim After July h
1994 or the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply to the Post-July
1,1994 Tort Claims.

The trial court's ruling is internally inconsistent. The court erroneously dismissed
the Grynberg Parties' post-1994 contract claims on the basis that the Contracts terminated
on July 1, 1994 and were otherwise time barred. The court, however, then turned around
and dismissed the Grynberg Parties' post-July 1, 1994 tort claims on the basis that the
parties had a contract and therefore the economic loss doctrine bars those claims. This
internal inconsistency cannot stand.
/.

The Post July L 1994 Contract Claims Cannot be Dismissed With
Prejudice.

Questar asserts that the Contracts were terminated effective July 1, 1994. The
Grynberg Parties contend that these Contracts have not been terminated and this issue is
currently being litigated in Questar IIL The trial court recognized that the grant of partial
summary judgment in Questar III is an "interlocutory order [that] is non-final and not yet
appealable." See S.J. Order ^f 5 at 3. Despite this recognition, the trial court charged
ahead and found that "all" of the Grynberg Parties' contract claims are barred by the four
year UCC statute of limitations (id.) and the court dismissed the Grynberg Parties'
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contract claims "with prejudice1' for all periods. Id. at 8 ("this action is dismissed in its
entirety with prejudice.1'). The trial court committed clear error.
If the Tenth Circuit (or Judge Johnson upon reconsideration) were to find in
Questar ///that the Contracts were not terminated effective July 1, 1994, then Questar's
"take or pay" objections continue after July 1, 1994 and its wrongful analysis of BTU
relating to such gas production cannot fall prey to a statute of limitations defense—the
only legal basis the court used to dismiss these contract claims. There is no justification
for dismissing claims for breaches of contract within the four year period prior to the
filing of this lawsuit (September 29, 1995 to present). While the Grynberg Parties
believe September 25, 1995 is not the cutoff date for contract claims based upon the
savings statute, in all events a trial must take place for periods after at least September
25,1995.
Questar implicitly recognizes as much, having agreed that tort claims related to
periods after September 29, 1995 are not barred by a similar four year statute of
limitations. See Defendants' Opening Memo at 87. By dismissing all contract claims,
even those related to periods after September 25, 1995, the trial court gave prejudicial
effect to the non-final appealable order of Judge Johnson in Questar III, which the trial
court clearly could not do. In Re Pintlar Corp., 124 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (an
interlocutory order does not have a preclusive effect in an unrelated action); see e.g.
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Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978) (collateral estoppel requires a
final judgment on the merits).
2.

If the Contracts Were Terminated on July I, 1994 The Economic
Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply to the Grynberg Parties' Tort Claims
for Negligent or Intentional Misrepresentation, Fraud, Res Ipsa
Loquitur and Negligence, and Equity (Injunction, Accounting,
Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment).

Even if the interlocutory order in Questar III is upheld, a trial must take place on
tort claims for, at a minimum, all periods after September 25, 1995. As noted above,
Questar admits that the tort claims are timely at least for periods three or four years prior
to the filing of this Complaint. See Defendants' Opening Brief at 87. While the
Grynberg Parties believe their claims are timely for all periods based upon assertion of
BTU claims in Questar II (as discussed below), the statute of limitations cannot serve as
a basis to deny the Grynberg Parties their day in court.
After acknowledging timeliness, Questar convinced the trial court to enter a ruling
that all tort "claims that relate to time periods after July 1994 . . . are barred . . . in their
entirety by the economic loss doctrine/' SJ. Order, ^f 15 at 6. This ruling is a
misapplication of the economic loss doctrine. The doctrine applies, if at all, only when a
contract remedy is available to the party seeking to bring a tort claim. "The economic
loss doctrine was developed and designed to protect contract law from being engulfed by
the law of products liability." Northwestern Public Seryice v. Union Carbide Corp., 115
F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (D. S.D. 2000) (citing EastRiyer Steamship Corp. v.
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Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2298 (1986)); see
also American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCIMechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,
1190 (Utah 1996) ("When a product does not perform or last as long as the consumer
thinks it should, the claim pertains to the quality of the product as measured by the
buyer's and user's expectations-expectations which emanate solely from the purchase
[contract]. Thus, contract principles resolve issues when the product does not meet the
user's expectations").1 Where no contract exists, the doctrine has no application.
While the Grynberg Parties and Questar have very different views on the scope of
the economic loss doctrine as applied to periods when a contract was in place (as
discussed below), the doctrine simply cannot apply after the time when Questar asserts
all contracts ended (July 1, 1994). Even the highly criticized economic loss case that
Questar primarily relies upon, Huron Tool andEng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Serv.,
Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), does not apply that doctrine to time
frames when the parties' relationship is not governed by a contract. Id. ("[T]he economic
loss doctrine does not apply where there is no contractual relationship between the
parties-that is, where the parties have never been in a position to negotiate the economic

l

See generally S. Tourate, T. Boyd & C. Schoenwatter, Bucking The "Trend:"
The Uniform Commercial Code, The Economic Loss Doctrine, And Common Law
Causes of Action For Fraud And Misrepresentation, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 875, 884 (Aug.
1999) ("the Economic Loss Doctrine, a judicially created doctrine, emerged as a method
used to protect the U.C.C. from circumvention by the emerging area of products liability
litigation") [hereinafter "The Economic Loss Doctrine And Common Law Fraud"].
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risks themselves.");2 see also Mcleod y. Barker, 764 So.2d 790, 792 (Fla. Ct App. 2000)
("the law is clear that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to tort claims where
there is no contractual relationship between the parties").
Consequently, this Court must order a trial on the Grynberg Parties' tort claims for
negligent or intentional misrepresentation, fraud, res ipsa loquitur and negligence and
equity (injunction, accounting, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment) for the period
after the contracts were terminated and for which Questar admits the claims are timely
without regard to the savings statute.3
B.

Questar's Alternative Arguments That The Grynberg Parties Failed to
Plead Claims for Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Third
Party Beneficiary Also Fail.
1.

The Grynberg Parties1 Tort Claim For Breach of Fiduciary Duty
and Conyersion Must Also be Tried.

The above analysis applies equally to the Grynberg Parties' tort claims for breach
of fiduciary duty and conversion. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the economic loss
2

See generally The Economic Loss Doctrine and Common Law Fraud, 84 Iowa L.
Rev. 875 (Aug. 1999) (discussing Huron in detail).
3

While Questar also challenged the negligent or intentional misrepresentation and
fraud claims under Rule 9(b), the trial court rejected Questar's arguments. See June 13,
2001 Minute Entry at 1-2 ("The defendants are to omit paragraph 21 of the Revised
Proposed Order. The Court did not rely on Rules 8, 12 or 9(b) in its Memorandum
Decision.") (R 2754-56) (Addendum Ex. U). Paragraph 21 of Questar's proposed Order,
which the trial court rejected, included a statement that "Plaintiffs failed to plead . . .
claims [for periods after July 1994] with particularity, as required by Rule 9(b), Utah R.
Civ. P., and also failed to meet minimal pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 12 by
failing to provide fair notice to each Defendant of the conduct alleged against each of
them." See R (2801L-T) (Addendum Ex. V).
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doctrine cannot preclude such claims for periods after the parties' contractual relationship
ended and those claims are admittedly timely after September 29, 1995 and September
25, 1996. See Defendants' Opening Brief at 87. Unlike the other tort claims where the
court rejected all Questar's alternative arguments for dismissal, the trial court made
additional rulings concerning these two claims which are also in error. See S.J. Order,
t f 17-18 at 7.
/.

The Grynberg Parties adequately plead conversion.

In its initial brief Questar did not make its "alternative" argument that the
conversion claim fails because the Grynberg Parties supposedly did not plead title to the
gas when Questar gathered and transported the gas after July 1994. The Memorandum
Decision likewise contains no separate analysis of the conversion claim beyond the
improper application of the economic loss doctrine. In Defendants1 Reply, however,
Questar argued for the first time that "Grynberg failed to allege a key element of...
conversion . . . namely, that he had title to the gas when it was gathered by QGMC
or transported by QPC." See Defendants' Reply at 56 (emphasis added). Questarfs
reply argument is unquestionably erroneous because the Grynberg Parties did allege that
they were the mineral owners of the gas at all relevant times and that Hunt merely sold
their production for their benefit. See Amended Complaint atfflf9, 13 and 23-26. These
undisputed facts were verified by affidavit and the Grynberg Parties have never given up
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their ownership interest in the minerals. See Statement of Facts atfflj1, 3 and 21-24.4
Despite this undisputed evidence of ownership, the trial court signed an order prepared
by Questar which states: "Plaintiffs conversion claim should be dismissed on the
additional ground that after 1994 Defendants only transported gas owned by parties other
than Plaintiffs." See SJ. Order, f 18 at 7.
There is absolutely no factual basis for this ruling which was designed to "plug a
hole" in the trial court's decision without giving the Grynberg Parties a chance to reply.
The only "factual" argument Questar offered to claim that the Grynberg Parties had no
"title" to the gas when it was "gathered by QGMC or transported by QPC" was a
reference to FERC's alleged "shipper must-have-title" policy for transportation by
QPC. See Defendants' Reply at 56. The first obvious problem with this argument is that
once gas gathering operations were transferred to QGMC on May 1, 1996, Questar
admits "QGMC measured the quantities of gas" (id. at 53) and the FERC policy does not
apply to QGMC or prove anything with respect to "title" as of the time of the incorrect
BTU analysis by QGMC. More importantly, the standard form "gas gathering
agreement" used by QGMC does not require that Hunt have "title," only that Hunt "owns

4

As stated in the Amended Complaint, the operating agreement authorized Hunt to
sell the Grynberg Parties' gas for the benefit of the Grynberg Parties. In addition, after
the Contracts with Questar were allegedly terminated, Hunt and the Grynberg Parties
entered into a series of "Marketing Letter Agreements" whereby Hunt was appointed as
an agent to sell gas on behalf of the Grynberg Parties but the Grynberg Parties never sold
their gas to Hunt.
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or otherwise controls supplies of gas" and the warranty is for "title to or the right to
deliver and use the gas shipped." See Grynberg Ex. 8 at Recital B and ^ 9 (R 2392)
(Addendum Ex. T); see also Amended Complaint \ 24. In actuality, the gas gathering
agreement expressly contemplates that ownership may reside with others because Hunt is
required to pay all amounts owed to the "mineral and royalty owners." Id. Questar's
"title" argument also ignores its admission that an affiliate purchased gas at the wellhead
in 1997 before it was ever transported by QPC {see Answer to First Amended Complaint
and Jury Trial Demand at \ 13 (R 862) and Questar concedes this gas "may have been
sold for Grynberg's benefit." Defendants' Reply at 48, n.15. In reality, as stated by the
Grynberg Parties' affidavit, gas was in fact sold to QETC for the Grynberg's benefit. See
Statement of Facts 1J 22.
In addition to the above problems with Questar's factual claim, Questar's "title"
argument completely misapplies Wyoming law. In Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Co., 884
P.2d 971 (Wyo. 1994) the defendant argued, similar to Questar, that a right to receive
proceeds from an oil field (i.e. a "net profits interest") "is not a property interest but
contractual in nature" and therefore that interest cannot be converted. Id. at 975. The
Wyoming Court first noted that under existing Wyoming law, oil and gas brought to the
surface is a property right in "the severed oil and gas and [in the] royalties, arising out of
the proceeds from their sale, paid as a money equivalent of the property interest." Id. at
975-76 (quoting Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Wyo. 1985)). The Court further
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held that the net profit interests which entitled the owner to "a share of the proceeds from
production in the oil and gas field" is "similar to a non-participatory royalty interest" and
as such could be the subject of a conversion claim. Id. at 976. The Court further
recognized that it is "an old and well established legal principle" that "money may be the
subject of a conversion action." Id. at 978.
In short, Questar's "shipper must-have-title" argument proves nothing factually
with respect to title and, more fundamentally, the Grynberg Parties, as the undisputed
owners of the mineral interests, have continuing property interests in the gas and in its
proceeds which QGMC fraudulently and intentionally converted. Consequently, the
Grynberg Parties have unquestionably stated a claim for conversion under Wyoming law.
//.

The Grynberg Parties adequately plead breach of fiduciary
duty.

Questar's alternative attack upon the breach of fiduciary duty claim concerned
whether the Grynberg Parties adequately pled the existence of a fiduciary duty. See
Defendants' Opening Memo at 79-82 ("Grynberg Fails to Plead Facts Sufficient for
Recognition of a Fiduciary Duty"). Questar offered no specific facts to support its legal
arguments and, as described in more detail below, the trial court cut off the Grynberg
Parties from doing any discovery. Consequently, the trial court could not properly cross
the line from Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to Rule 56, without first informing the Grynberg
Parties that it was going to go beyond the legal arguments made by Questar and without
giving the Grynberg Parties an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P.
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12(b)(6) ("all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all materials made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56) (emphasis added). Moreover, the existence of a
fiduciary duty is a question of fact for the jury.5
Further, because Questar attacked only the adequacy of the pleading, the trial
court was required to assume as true all facts in the Grynberg Parties' Amended
Complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the Grynberg Parties. See
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light, 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). The trial court was
also required to make all reasonable inferences in favor of the Grynberg Parties and the
Amended Complaint had to be construed liberally. Id. In light of these standards, the
Grynberg Parties clearly plead a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
The trial court's finding of no fiduciary duty appears to be premised entirely on the
claim that Jack Grynberg, who is only one of three Plaintiffs in this case, is
knowledgeable about gas production. That conclusion fails for three reasons. First,
Questar is a common carrier with heightened duties and responsibilities. See Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, 750 N.E.2d 52, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (after FERC's

5

See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo. 1993) (cert, denied
511 U.S. 1137, 114 S.Ct. 2153 (1994)) ("The existence of the fiduciary relationship is a
question of fact for the jury"); Long v. Greatwest Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 823,
828 (Wyo. 1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment on the basis that there had been
no factual development as to fiduciary duty and there existed genuine questions of
material fact); General Bus. Machines v. National Semiconductor Datachecker, 664 F.
Supp. 1422, 1424 (D. Utah 1987) ("whether within these facts a fiduciary relationship
was created involves questions of fact which must await further development of the
record").
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1992 Order 636 ''pipelines became common carriers of natural gas?f). Courts consistently
hold that the common carrier relationship creates a fiduciary duty to the passenger or
customer. Stafford v. Intrav, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Mo. 1993), affd 16 F.3d
1228 (8th Cir. 1994); O'Keefe v. Inca Floats, Inc., 1997 WL 703784 at *4 (N.D. Cal.
October 31, 1997); McDonald v. Railway Exp. Agency, Inc., 81 S.E.2d 525, 526 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1954). The obligation to transport partakes of "a fiduciary character as to require
the utmost fairness and good faith on its part in dealing with the shipper and in the
discharge of its duties to him .. .,f Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Collins Produce Co., 249
U.S. 186, 193, 39 S.Ct. 189, 190 (1919). Questar served as a common carrier and
undertook the task of measuring and analyzing the gas it gathered and transported. As a
common carrier, Questar has fiduciary duties which give rise to an independent cause of
action.
Second, Questar's fiduciary relationship to the Grynberg Parties is also implied in
law because Questar undertook a duty to act for their benefit determining the heating
content of the natural gas that is the subject of their relationship. A "fiduciary
relationship" exists when one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of another upon
matters within the scope of their relationship. Martinez v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. of
Colo., Inc., 891 P.2d 785, 788 (Wyo. 1995); Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference of
the United Methodist Church, 923 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 519
U.S. 1093, 117 S.Ct. 771 (1997); First Sec. Bank of Utah N. A. v. BanberryDev.
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Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 (Utah 1990).6 A fiduciary duty may arise when one party
occupies a superior position relative to another and it may also be based upon
professional, business, or personal relationships. Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 916 P.2d
643, 646 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). Quite simply, a fiduciary relationship may exist under a
variety of circumstances, and "does exist in cases where there has been a special
confidence reposed in one who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good
faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence." Denison
State Bankv. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Kan. 1982). The Grynberg Parties have
alleged that they placed such trust in Questar pursuant to Questar's commitment to
accurately measure the Grynberg Parties' gas.
Lastly, Questar1 s argument that because one of the parties, Jack Grynberg, "is a
sophisticated participant in the field of gas production" Questar was not in a position of
superiority over all of the Grynberg Parties is not an issue that can be resolved without a
trial. The issue of whether a fiduciary duty exists is a question of fact for the jury. See
supra note 6.

6

Although Wyoming law applies to the Wyoming wells and Colorado law applies
to the Colorado wells, no choice of law analysis is necessary because as the above cases
recognize, Wyoming, Utah and Colorado recognize that a fiduciary relationship exists
when one person has a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another and exercises
influence over another.
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2.

The Grynberg Parties' Third Party Beneficiary Claims Have Been
Properly Plead.

The trial court's decision to dismiss with prejudice the third party beneficiary
claim presents perhaps the best example of the trial court's determination to rid itself of
this lawsuit, followed by an attempt to create a rationale. The trial court committed both
procedural and substantive errors.
/.

The Grynberg Parties' pleading was upheld and the Court
could not properly go beyond the pleading without discovery
concerning the involved contracts.

At the outset, it must be kept in mind that Questar's only attack with respect to the
third party beneficiary claims was whether the Grynberg Parties had pled the elements of
a claim. See Defendants' Opening Memo at 54-57. Indeed, on reply, Questar proposed
that ,f[i]n fairness to the Questar defendants and to save the court time and energy in
sorting through these confusing claims, Grynberg should be required to re-plead."
Questar Reply at 49. The trial court sided with the Grynberg Parties with respect to
Questar's attack on the pleading and specifically instructed Questar to omit from its
proposed order any "suggestion that the plaintiffs 'failed to purposely plead' [third party
beneficiary status]." See June 13, 2001 Minute Entry, at 1f 1 (R 2754-55) (Addendum Ex.
U).7

7

Questar's proposed order, which was rejected, stated that "Plaintiffs failed to
properly plead . . . third-party contractual beneficiary status." See Defendants' revised
Proposed S.J. Order, ^ 17 at 7 (R 2801G) (Addendum Ex. V).
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Remarkably, the trial court nevertheless dismissed the third party beneficiary
claim with prejudice even though Questar presented no evidence and its only challenge
was to the sufficiency of the pleading. In fact, in arguing that no third party beneficiary
status could exist under the Hunt Contracts, Questar refused to produce for the trial
court's review those contracts which are exclusively in its control. Despite this void of
evidence and the court's own conclusion that the pleading was sufficient, the trial court
dismissed the claim with prejudice without ever reviewing or allowing the Grynberg
Parties to review the Hunt Contracts. The trial court did so by entering a finding that the
Grynberg Parties "failed to submit facts to support third-party contractual beneficiary
status." S.J. Order, Tf 15 at 6. This "finding" was made notwithstanding Questar's
exclusive possession of the evidence-the Hunt Contracts~and the fact that Questar
challenged the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the evidence. In Richards Irrigation Co.
v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the trial court made this same error,
dismissing a third party beneficiary claim at the motion to dismiss stage. The Court of
Appeals reversed and held:
To determine whether a party is a third-party beneficiary, the trial
court must examine the intent of the contracting parties as
evidenced by the contract and surrounding facts and
circumstances. Because the determination of intent is a factual
determination, the trial court erred in dismissing this claim as a
matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6).
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Id. at 10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
At a minimum, the Grynberg Parties were entitled to have Questar produce the
Hunt contracts and to conduct discovery before the court could make factual findings.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) mandates that before a motion to dismiss is converted into one
under Rule 56 "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56." Id. The failure to allow any discovery and
to rule on summary judgment when the only argument Questar presented concerned the
pleadings is clear error. For example, in Strand v. Associated Students of the Univ. of
Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977) the trial court granted a motion to dismiss after relying
upon documents offered by the defendant outside the pleadings. This Court held that
once the trial court decides to treat as a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment:
the mandatory provision of Rule 12(b) controls, viz., all parties must
be given adequate notice and opportunity to submit supporting
materials, particularly the party against whom summary judgment is
entered.
It is error to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment, without giving the adverse party an opportunity to present
pertinent material. The action of the trial court in denying plaintiff

*See also Clarkv. American Standard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1978)
(whether the contracting parties intended plaintiff to be a beneficiary is a question of
fact); Hanley v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 533, 536 (D. Colo. 1988) ("the
issue of whether a person is an intended third party beneficiary is, at least partially, a
question of fact, a n d , . . . the facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true for
purposes of this motion to dismiss") (applying Colorado law); Oost-Lievense v. North
Am. Consortium, 969 F. Supp. 874, 878 (S.D.N. Y. 1997) ("[t]he resolution of plaintiff s
[third party beneficiary] status is, ultimately, a question of fact for the jury to decide").
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the reasonable opportunity to present controverting material violated
the mandate of the rule.
Id. at 193; see also Bekins Bar VRanch v. Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151,
152 (Utah 1978).
Not only were Questarfs arguments directed only at the pleadings, the trial court
refused all discovery. The Grynberg Parties provided the only evidence they need on this
point, Questarfs standard form agreement, but the actual Hunt Contracts are in Questar's
possession, not Grynberg's. The trial court offered no rationale for precluding discovery
but based its decision upon an overly broad assertion that the "core issues are centered
around the statute of limitations and the legal principle of the economic loss doctrine.'1
See Memorandum Decision at 2, n. 1. That rationale in no way addresses the third party
beneficiary claim and the court's granting of summary judgment must be overturned.
ii.

The Grynberg Parties are third party beneficiaries to the
Contracts between Questar and Hunt.

If this Court is inclined to deal with the substance of the third party beneficiary
claim as plead, despite the absence of contracts in the record, it is clear the Grynberg
Parties have properly plead that claim based upon the form contract attached to the
Grynberg Parties' opposition. See Grynberg Ex. 9 (Addendum Ex. T). In analyzing this
form, Questar grossly misstated the law below.
In Colorado and Wyoming, there is a two part test based upon the Restatement
(Second) Contracts § 302 (1981) for determining whether one is an intended beneficiary:
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(1) the recognition of the beneficiary's right must be "appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties," and (2) the performance must satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary or the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.9 Richardson
Assoc, v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 808 (Wyo. 1991); Smith v. TCI
Communications, Inc., 981 P.2d 690, 693 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999). Winters v. Schulman,
977 P.2d 1218, 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).
Moreover, the third party beneficiary does not have to be specifically mentioned in the
contract. Wyoming Machinery Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 614 P.2d 716, 720
(Wyo. 1980); Smith, 981 P.2d at 693.
The Grynberg Parties own working interests in producing gas wells operated by
Hunt. Since the attempted unilateral termination of the Contracts, their gas has been sold
to Questar and/or its affiliates pursuant to contracts between Hunt and Questar. The
Grynberg Parties do not have copies of these Contracts and notwithstanding that Questar
attached several inches of exhibits supporting its motion it completely failed to produce
the Hunt Contracts. The Grynberg Parties have copies of the standard form contracts
Questar uses. Questar and its affiliates are the only gatherer and the only common carrier
pipeline serving the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field. By necessity they gather and transport all

9

The law and analysis is the same in Wyoming, Colorado and Utah since all three
states have adopted the Restatement (Second) Contracts § 302 and, therefore, no choice
of law analysis is necessary.
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of the Grynberg Parties' production. In addition to transporting, Questar buys the gas
from Hunt, and Questar has agreed to measure the gas volume and analyze the heating
content as it enters the gas gathering and pipeline and to accurately report the results to
the parties for purposes of payment.
Specifically, Questar promises in the standard form contract to accurately measure
the volume and BTU of all gas gathered so that accurate billing and balancing can take
place. See Grynberg Ex. 8 (Addendum Ex. T) at t5.1 (nGas volumes [including BTU
determined by QGMC] will be used for billing, balancing and calculation of fuel use1');
15.5 (BTU is measured under identified standards "with any subsequent amendments or
revisions that QGM[C] may adopt.") and 1ft 5.11 and 5.12 ("The accuracy of all
measuring equipment will be verified by QGM[C] at reasonable intervals.... If any
measuring equipment is found to be inaccurate, the equipment will be adjusted
immediately to measure accurately.... [A]ny payments based upon inaccurate
measurement will be corrected"). The beneficiaries of Questar1 s express promises to
measure accurately and to correct all payments based upon discovered inaccuracies are
identified explicitly in the standard form to include all "mineral and royalty owners."
The form explicitly provides that Hunt will pay all such owners, such as the
Grynberg Parties, for the gas purchased according to the measurements and BTU
values Questar supplies. See id. at 19 ("[Hunt] shall have the obligation to make
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settlements for all royalties due and payments owed to [Hunt's] mineral and royalty
owners.").
The Grynberg Parties thus are identified, by category, as beneficiaries of the Hunt
Contracts which is all Wyoming law requires. As stated in Peters Grazing Assfn v.
LegerskU 544 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1975):
Where a person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third
person, such third person may maintain an action thereon even
though he is a stranger to the contract and the consideration therefor
and had no knowledge of the contract when it was made and was not
specifically named therein so long as he is otherwise sufficiently
described or designated.
Id. at 457. Further, correct payment by Hunt to the Grynberg Parties clearly protects
Questar from mineral owners1 claims but such payment is entirely dependent upon
Questar correctly analyzing BTU, as is recognized in the contract. In short, the Hunt
Contracts expressly mandate payment to the Grynberg Parties based upon correct BTU
determinations by Questar.
Questar tries to create confusion by arguing that in approximately March 1996
FERC imposed a requirement that gas gathered by QGMC and transferred by QPC be
titled in the name of the shipper (Hunt) before being transported by QPC. Defendants1
Opening Memo at 56. To the extent Questar1 s argument can be deciphered, Questar
seems to be saying that because QPC did not take title to the gas during certain undefined
periods, it could not intend to benefit mineral owners despite the express language in the
standard gathering contract that mineral owners will be paid in accordance with the BTU
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measurement made by Questar. It should first be noted that Questarfs argument is
factually inaccurate because Questar has admitted that for at least some period of 1997,
QETC did take title to the Grynberg Parties' gas. See Answer, *{ 13 at 4 (R 862);
Questarfs Reply at 48, n.15.10 Under Wyoming law, the Grynberg Parties therefore held
"an automatically perfected security interest" in the gas sold to QETC and they would
thereby be "creditor" beneficiaries of the promise to pay royalty owners. See Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 34.1-9-319. The FERC regulation Questar relies upon also has no application to
QGMC, the entity that actually gathers the gas and measures BTU under the standard
form gathering contract. Lastly, Questar's contention that Hunt, not the Grynberg Parties,
owns the gas is factually untrue and directly contrary to Questarfs own contract language
which notes that Hunt in some circumstances merely "controls" the gas and in such
circumstances Hunt must pay all "mineral and royalty owners." See Grynberg Ex. 8 at
Recital B and ^ 9 (Addendum Ex. T); see also discussion supra in Section I.B.l.i.
Most importantly, Questar's argument boils down, in substance, to an assertion
that the only type of intended beneficiary recognized in the law is one who would have a
direct obligation to the beneficiary, i.e. a "creditor beneficiary." That legal assertion is
plainly wrong. There is no legal requirement that QPC (or QGMC) take title to the gas

10

Questar feigns ignorance as to who the mineral owner is with respect to such gas
but given the years of litigation between the parties and its knowledge of ownership of
the involved wells, that claim is clearly without substance. Discovery—which the trial
court denied—would easily disprove Questar's feigned ignorance.
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or that it owe royalty payments to the Grynberg Parties in order to recognize third party
beneficiary status. The Restatement (Second) Contracts § 302 expressly covers parties
who owe money to the beneficiary (referred to under the First Restatement of Contracts
as "creditor beneficiaries") (id. § 302(l)(a)) and any other party for whom "the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance." Id. § 302(l)(b). By agreeing to measure BTU so that mineral
owners can be paid based upon such measurements, there is unquestionably a
circumstance demonstrating intent to benefit regardless of whether the beneficiary is a
creditor of the promissor.11
Questar clearly intended to obtain protection for itself and its affiliates and benefit
the Grynberg Parties by insuring that interest owners were correctly paid based upon

n

Questar?s argument that the promissor had to be a creditor of the beneficiary is
refuted by overwhelming authority. For example, when a property owner (as promisee)
obtains a promise from his builder (as promissor) to pay all laborers and materials
suppliers on a house, intended beneficiary states exists for such laborers and suppliers
"whether or not they have power to create liens on the house" and thereby are otherwise
creditors of the owner. See Restatement (Second) § 302, Illustration 12. Another
example (decided prior to adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts) is found in
Peters Grazing Ass'n v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1975). In that case, the promisee
(an executor of an estate) denied any legal obligation to the plaintiff (a realtor). Id. at
453. The executor nevertheless obtained a promise from the buyer of real property (the
promissor) to pay a commission to the realtor (the third party beneficiary). The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that once the promise to pay is made "it is immaterial
whether the promisee is actually indebted . . . at all." Id. at 457. The beneficiary
(Grynberg) may "sue to enforce such performance even though not named in the contract
and not privy to its consideration, and even though the contract works to the advantage
of the contracting parties and the purpose in conferring a benefit on third party was a
selfish one, benefitting or protecting themselves." Id. at 458.
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Questar's measurements, which Questar concedes. See Defendants' Reply at 57 ("Hunt is
. . . agreeing to protect the gatherer [Questar] from any claims by others"). The fact that
due to regulatory issues QPC no longer took formal title once the gas entered the pipeline
is irrelevant. Although the trial court refused all discovery and the facts and
circumstances were never developed below, it is also possible that another Questar entity
ended up with ultimate title to some of the Grynberg Parties' gas in addition to the gas
purchased by QETC (creating creditor beneficiary status) since QPC transports gas to
"the Wasatch front and communities in Wyoming and Idaho" where it is sold by a
Questar affiliate. See Defendants' Reply at 61. By agreeing to correctly measure the gas
and by insuring that the royalty owners were paid, QPC and/or QGMC could thereby
protect themselves as well as an affiliated company that ends up as the final purchaser of
gas.12 In short, Questar's arguments with respect to QPC not taking title to the gas are

12

Promises that benefit affiliates are not uncommon in third party beneficiary law.
See Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah
1989) (upholding (under the Restatement (Second) Contracts § 302) a third party
beneficiary's right to sue shareholders who promised to pay a debt, even though the debt
was not an original obligation of those shareholders). The Restatement (Second)
Contracts § 302 contains other examples of situations where a promise to pay will be
upheld, even if the benefit of such promise runs to an affiliate. For example, illustration
6 reads:
A's son C is indebted to D. With the purpose of assisting C, A
secures from B a promise to pay the debt to D. Both C and D are
intended beneficiaries under Subsection (l)(b) [of the Restatement
(Second) Contracts § 302].
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irrelevant in light of the promises to measure and bill for gas correctly and express
identification of the mineral owners as beneficiaries of those promises.
IL

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FAILED TO APPLY THE ONE
YEAR SAVINGS STATUTE IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-40 TO THE
GRYNBERG PARTIES' TORT CLAIMS.
The Grynberg Parties' tort and contract claims are based upon Questarfs incorrect

BTU adjustments of natural gas Questar purchased from the Grynberg Parties. The
Grynberg Parties asserted their BTU claims in Questar II in 1993. On October 1, 1998
Judge Johnson entered an order of dismissal without prejudice related to the Grynberg
Parties' BTU claims. Questar II, however, was not finally resolved until March 20, 2000
when Judge Johnson entered the Questar //Final Judgment. The Grynberg Parties
brought this suit on September 29, 1999 alleging BTU claims, under both contract and
tort theories, which relate back to the BTU claims asserted in Questar II, within the
applicable one-year savings statute.13
Despite these facts, the trial court determined that the six month savings statute in
the Uniform Commercial Code "trumps" the savings statute contained in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-40 and the former statute applies to this entire "case," including the six noncontract claims. See Memorandum Decision at 6; S.J. Order, ^ 7 at 3. The trial court

13

Utah's one-year savings statute provides f?[i]f any action is commenced within
due time . . . the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than
upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for commencing the same
shall have expired, the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year after the
reversal or failure." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40.
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committed error because even if this Court finds that the UCC savings statute applies to
the contract claims, that statute cannot apply to the Grynberg Parties' six noncontract claims. In addition, the Grynberg Parties pled the same conduct, transaction or
occurrence in Questar //that serves as the basis for its tort claims in this case.
A,

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 Does Not Apply to Grynberg's Non-Tort
Claims.

As argued below, the six month savings period provided in Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-725(3) does not expire until six months after the entry of the Questar //Final
Judgment on March 20, 2000 and therefore all contract claims governed by that statute
are timely. The UCC savings statute, however, has very limited application. That
savings provision is part of a Utah Uniform Commercial Code section which applies only
to f,[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale.'1 See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(l).
The savings provision itself {id. § 70A-2-725(3)) applies only to "the same breach" of
contract identified in § 70A-2-725(l). This Court has recognized that the statute of
limitations in UCC § 2-725 applies only to breach of warranty claims, not independent
tort claims. See Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11,17
(Utah 1990). In Davidson this Court explained that ff§ 2-725 was intended to apply only
to cases of breach of contract [as] reflected in the Official Comments [which] defme[]
consequential damages to include 'injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty.'" Id. at 17, n.6; see also Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
716 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1986) (while § 2-725 applies to a claim for breach of warranty,
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a separate tort statute of limitations applies to claims for negligence and strict liability);
Persichiniv. BradRagan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168, 176 (Colo. 1987) (M[t]he intended effect of
section [UCC 2-725fs statute of limitations]... is to provide sellers with a definite and
uniform starting and termination date for possible warranty liability on a contract of
sale"); Wieser v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 596 F. Supp. 1473, 1475 (D. Colo.
1984) (applying Colorado law and holding that UCC 2-725 supplies the statute of
limitations for breach of warranty claims but does not apply to tort claims of
misrepresentation).
Even the case Questar relies upon for application of the UCC savings provision,
Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1106 (111. 1998), recognizes that the
UCC savings provision applies to only "one subject,'1 while other savings statutes apply
"to cases generally." In Portwood, the Court held:
Section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly governs a
wide variety of actions, both real and personal. Conversely, UCC
Section 2-725(3) governs only actions for breach of contracts for
sale.
Id. Recognizing this limited scope, the Court in Portwood dismissed the action because
the only claims asserted were for breach of warranty arising out of a sales contract. Id. at
1102; see also Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 685 N.E.2d 941, 943 (111. App. Ct. 1997)
("Plaintiff styled their complaint as a two count action for breach of warranty").
Judge Hanson erred in applying Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3) to this entire
11

case," including the Grynberg Parties' six tort claims covering periods both before and
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after the Contracts allegedly terminated. The trial court also erred in finding that the
Grynberg Parties' tort claims never made the pleadings in Questar II as discussed below.
See Memorandum at 8, n.4; S J. Order, <|fl[ 9 and 4.
B.

The Grynberg Parties1 BTU Claims in This Action Relate Back to the
BTU Claims Asserted in Questar II.
I.

Background Related to the Savings Statute.

Savings statutes are designed to avoid the forfeiture of a plaintiff s legal rights and
reflect an "intent to protect those who, although having filed in good faith and in a timely
manner, would suffer a complete loss of relief on the merits because of a procedural
defect" LaBarge Inc. v. Universal Circuits Inc., 751 F. Supp. 807, 809 (W.D. Ark.
1990). As a remedial statute, savings provisions are construed liberally in favor of
having cases decided on the merits. Id; Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Angle, 976
S.W.2d 608, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (fbeing highly remedial, [the statute] should
receive a liberal construction, and except in a case where the facts and circumstances
plainly require, should not be interpreted . . . to defeat the beneficent purpose"); Kinney
v. Ohio Dept. of Admin. Serv., 507 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (savings
statute is a remedial statute to be construed liberally and such statutes are "perfectly
consistent with the goals statutes of limitations are designed to serve.").
This case presents a compelling case for liberal application of the statute. In
Questar II, the Grynberg Parties sought to be fully paid for their gas based upon correct
application of the three components of payment: price; volume; and BTU (heating
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value). As a result of the Tenth Circuit's reinstatement of the jury verdict in Questar II,
the Grynberg Parties have been compensated at the correct price and volume. With
respect to the third fundamental component of payment, BTU, the Grynberg Parties have
never received their day in court due to Questar's unwillingness to have that issue tried in
Questar II. Questar's arguments that the Grynberg Parties did not fully plead BTU in
Questar II must be viewed as inconsistent with the fundamental public policy of Utah
reflected in the savings statute to have disputes decided on the merits.
2.

Application of the Utah Savings Statute to Questar II

Once applied, the savings statute ensures timeliness for all the Grynberg Parties'
claims for all periods.14 Where a new action is filed after the expiration of the limitations
period, the new action will relate back to an earlier action, for purposes of the Utah
savings statute, if the new action is substantially the same as the previous action.
Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, N.A., 995 P.2d 7, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Wilcox v.

14

Questar and the trial court failed to recognize the interplay between the savings
statute and the Grynberg Parties' allegations of fraudulent concealment. The Order
drafted by Questar concludes that the Grynberg Parties were on notice of incorrect BTU
analysis "by no later than early 1995." See S.J. Order, ^f 6 at 3. While knowledge of
Questar's intentional activities has grown greatly, the Grynberg Parties have never argued
that they did not discover incorrect BTU analysis during Questar II Discovery of the
incorrect BTU adjustment during the pendency of Questar II is irrelevant, however,
because all the Grynberg Parties' claims relate back to the filing of BTU claims in
Questar II. Fraudulent concealment is relevant only with respect to claims that would
otherwise be untimely as of the date of first filing in Questar II. With respect to those
early periods, the Grynberg Parties have adequately pled fraudulent concealment and the
trial court made no adverse findings of notice during this early time frame. In fact, the
trial court upheld the Grynberg Parties' allegations of fraud. See supra note 3.
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Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996); Moffitt v. Barr, 837 P.2d 572, 575
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (applying event or transaction test to counterclaim filed in reliance
on savings statute). The two actions are substantially the same if they arise out of the
same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. Id. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c).15 Courts in Utah
have emphasized that relation back is particularly appropriate where the real parties in
interest have been sufficiently alerted to the proceedings. Hebertson, 995 P.2d at 12;
Wilcox, 911 P.2d at 370; Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216-17
(Utah 1984); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 581, 586-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see
also 6A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1497 at 85 (1990) (rationale underlying Rule 15(c) is to allow relation back

15

Questar attempts to confuse this standard by suggesting the claims must be
"identical," which is a much stricter standard of interpretation than "substantially the
same." In doing so, Questar fails to cite a single Utah case holding that a stricter
standard is required. More importantly, Questar completely ignores the clear directive of
Hebertson, that a claim is substantially the same if it arises out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as the issues raised in the original pleading. Utah Courts are
not alone in applying Rule 15(c) analysis to savings statutes. See Centerre Bank of
Kansas City v. Angle, 976 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (under the savings
statute, as with amendments, the "relevant consideration is whether the pleading arises
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Chandler v. Denton, 741
P.2d 855, 862 (Okla. 1987) (for savings statute purposes the court uses a transactional
approach); Harnett v. Parris, 1995 WL 550036 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 1995) (for savings
statute purposes the prior complaint "need only give the other side notice of the operative
facts, transaction, event or occurrence for which relief is being sought"); Koerpor & Co.,
Inc. v. UnitedInt'l, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Mo. 1987) (applying Rule 15(c) same
conduct, transaction or occurrence analysis to compare two lawsuits).
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where opposing party has been put on notice regarding claim or defense raised by
amended pleading) (citations omitted).
Under the Rule 15(c) analysis, whether the two actions involve the same legal
theories is irrelevant, as long as the new claims arise out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c); Williams v. Nelson, 145 P. 39, 40 (Utah 1914) (applying the Utah
savings statute and noting that for purposes of evaluating what is pled in the first action
the only duty is to plead "operative facts, as distinguished from the evidentiary facts and
conclusions [] [and] [t]he pleader is not required to follow any particular form or special
theory [] if the facts stated entitle the plaintiff to any relief under the substantive law'1).
Thus, even if the first action alleges only a breach of contract action, a second action
alleging new tort theories will relate back to the original action so long as it satisfies Rule
15(c)fs same conduct, transaction or occurrence test. See, e.g., C. Corkin & Sons, Inc. v.
Tide Water Ass'd Oil Co., 20 F.R.D. 402, 404 (D. Mass 1957) (allowing plaintiff to
allege common law deceit after originally seeking relief on an oral rental agreement); 6A
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane Federal Practice and Procedure §
1497 at 98 (1990) ("an amendment may set forth a different statute as the basis of the
claim, or change a common law claim to a statutory claim or vice-versa, or shift from a
contract theory to a tort theory") (citations omitted)16.
l6

See also Johansen v. E.I. DuPontDe Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1381 (5th
(continued...)
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The liberal nature of Rule 15(c) analysis is rooted in important public policy set
forth in Rule 8. In Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996) this Court
recognized the connection between Rule 8 and Rule 15(c):
This court has interpreted [Rule 15(c)] consistently with the liberal
pleading practices mandated by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.... ff[T]he fundamental purpose of our liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their
dispute.1" "What [the parties] are entitled to is notice of the
issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required."
Id. at 369 (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) and
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963)) (emphasis added).

(...continued)
Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S. Ct. 148 (1987) (amendment asserting
claims predicated on breach of implied and express warranty which arose out of same
personal injury accident out of which strict products liability claim asserted in original
complaint arose related back to original complaint); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain
Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1260 n.29 (9th Cir. 1982) (amended claim
including new theory of fraud was proper because fraud claim and antitrust claim
involved same transaction, occurrence, or core of operative facts); Southern Colo.
Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm% 586 F.2d 1342, 1347
(10th Cir. 1978) (new theory related back to date of filing of original complaint where
new theory based on same facts and circumstances complained of in original complaint);
Baruah v. Young, 536 F. Supp. 356, 364 (D. Md. 1982) (additional theories of recovery
in amended complaint are proper as long as new claims arise from same transaction,
occurrence, or core of operative facts); Mach v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 198 F. Supp.
471, 472 (W.D. Pa. 1960) (amended complaint seeking to recover under different legal
theory not barred by statute of limitations because new theory arose out of same
transaction, occurrence, or core of operative facts).
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For purposes of amendments and/or savings statutes, the focus is on notice of a
transaction, act or occurrence because under Rule 8(a) there is no need to even specify a
legal theory. Rule 8(a) merely requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). In Bartholet v. Reishauer
AG., 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992) the Court set out the guiding principles:
Although it is common to draft complaints with multiple counts,
each of which specifies a single statute or legal rule, nothing in the
Rules of Civil Procedure requires this. To the contrary, the rules
discourage it. Complaints should be short and simple, giving the
adversary notice while leaving the rest to further documents.
[T]he complaint need not identify a legal theory, and specifying an
incorrect theory is not fatal.
Complaints in a system of notice pleading initiate the litigation
but recede into the background as the case progresses. Later
documents, such as the pretrial order under Rule 16(e), refine
the claims; briefs and memoranda supply the legal arguments
that bridge the gap between facts and judgments.
Id. at 1078 (emphasis added); Williams v. Nelson, 145 P. at 40 (the complaint should
plead "operative facts, as distinguished from the evidentiary facts and conclusions"); see
also Harmon v. Billings Bench Water Users Ass'n, 765 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir. 1992)
("Under Rule 8 ( a ) . . . [a] party need not plead specific legal theories in the complaint, so
long as the other side receives notice as to what is at issue in the case.") (quoting
American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Or., 690 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir.
1982)).
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Consequently, not only can the pleadings assert different legal theories, additional
or more specific allegations will relate back to the original cause of action as well. For
example, in Sherman v. Air Reduction Sales Co., 251 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1958) a plaintiff
filed a complaint alleging negligence based upon a tank's allegedly defective valve and
valve seal. After a dismissal of the first lawsuit, the plaintiff filed a new complaint that
was "much longer and more elaborate" which specified six new ways that the defendant
was allegedly negligent that "were without counterpart in the earlier petition." The court
nevertheless found that the lawsuits were substantially the same and gave the savings
statute a liberal construction "in order that controversies shall be decided upon important
substantive questions rather than upon technicalities of procedure." Id. at 546 (internal
citations omitted).17 Sherman is similar to this case in that the Grynberg Parties now
know and have alleged in detail the specific ways in which Questar incorrectly analyzed
BTU. See Amended Complaint Tflf 36-62. Knowledge of how Questar achieved its
wrongful analysis of BTU does not, however, change the essence of what was always

11

See also Madarash v. Long Island Railroad Co., 654 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y
1987) (applying savings statute and noting that second complaint may contain more
particularized facts); hind v. Vanguard Offset Printers, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1060, 1068-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (second amended complaint, which included allegations not included in
first amended complaint, alleging omissions and misrepresentations, related back to first
complaint); Senger v. Soo Line R.R. Co.} 493 F. Supp. 143, 145 (D. Minn. 1980)
(doctrine of relation back for purposes of statute of limitations will apply when
amendment adds more specific factual detail); Kansas Milling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d
413, 416 (10th Cir. 1950) (relation back allowed where amended charge made general
allegations more specific).
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a n lei ldments increasing the amoi int claimed in damages or changing a demand for
equitable relief to one for legal relief also relate back to the original pleading. See
Hartford Accident & Indent. Co, v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919, 922-23 (Utah 1943) (amended
complaint which increased a uamagL

\.

Iilitiiilini! I'toim Ih.it nriinnallv st;t(cdI,

,
.. •

Taking into account the above law, the Grynberg Parties' claims, which are based
upon Questar's incorrect BTU adjustments, are substantially the same r^ uu b i
asserted in yuc*;*.r * .i. *.: ^
sd fi »i1li

[/ •. • ,

uan;;s

. transactior
,:

*i;\r- --r of Questar II, the Grynberg Parties

discovered that Questar had been wrongfully determining the heating content of natural
gas sold by the Grynberg Parties to Questar. Accordingly, on July 19, 1993, the
Grynberg Paities amended (lieu etHJiileicLiini, iillcyin^ (Lil truestar "|>iiul (or gas
p I ii chased from [the Grynberg Parties] using incorrect BTU adjustments." Questar Ex.
. J, U 14 (R 1605) (Addendum L.\. i >. The Grynberg Parties also alleged that "[a]s a
result of [Questar's] actions and breaches, the [Grynberg Parties] have been and w i.. .J

agreements and the price actually paid by [Questar]." Id. % 15. After incorporating the
BTU adjustment claim, the Grynberg Parties alleged that "[Questar] intentionally,
culpably and without justification caused injury to the [Grynberg Parties] and their

business and to the [Grynberg Parties'] legally protected property interests and engaged
in a bad faith pattern of willful misconduct to injure the [Grynberg Parties].ff See Questar
Ex. 13,128. The Grynberg Parties alleged that Questar's acts "were intentional, wilful
and wanton, and [Questar] should be held liable for punitive damages to the [Grynberg
Parties]." Id. ]f 36. All of these allegations were made in the context of the long-term
Contracts for which Questar had started litigation to have the court determine the parties'
long-term rights.
Thus, the Grynberg Parties' counterclaim in Questar II included claims for breach
of contract and tort based upon Questar's incorrect BTU adjustment of the Grynberg
Parties' natural gas. The Grynberg Parties' claims in this case arise out of the same
conduct, namely, Questar's incorrect BTU adjustments to the value of natural gas for
which the Grynberg Parties are paid. Accordingly, the Grynberg Parties' claims in this
case arise out of the same conduct, transaction and occurrence as alleged in Questar II
and, for purposes of the savings statute, relate back to the claims asserted in Questar II
Because the Grynberg Parties' claims in this case arise from the same facts as the
claims alleged in Questar II, it is inconsequential that the Grynberg Parties have
articulated more specific facts, asserted additional legal theories and sought more
damages. Most importantly, Questar knew from the Grynberg Parties' original
counterclaim, that the Grynberg Parties are seeking to enforce a claim for damages
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sustained because of Questar's incorrect H : - adjustment1 i See Zagurski v. American
7ohm I H i ii
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beginning that plaintiff is trying to enforce a claim for damages sustained from smoking
cigarettes it manufactured and marketed and therefore it is not unreasonable to require it
to anticipate all theories of recovery and prepare its defense accordingly); see L<*M* , ...T
v (fh mih ? Coast I If i , • R R. G > 323 1 J S 5 ; f; 581 82, i 55 S Cl 1 21 1 2 1 25(19' Iki: )
(whether defendant had notice of issues raised in amended claim is often most important
indicator of whether a dismissed action and refiled action are substantially the same).
Ironical!) , Questar has attempted to i ise its knowledge of what the Giynberg

Questar argued that discovery is unnecessary because fraudulent concealment is not a
credible claim in light of all parties' understanding of the allegations of inaccurate BTU
analysis in Questar 11 , Questar told the ti ial court: at an early stage of this case the
following:
First there can be no genuine issue of concealment where the
Plaintiffs already sued Questar for breach of contract due to alleged
BTU mismeasurement (in their private 1993 lawsuit [Questar II]. . ,
It is beyond dispute that claims were not only discovered, but
were actually filed, more than four years before the Complaint
herein, so that there can be no issue of concealment and the only

I8

Questar was well aware of the Giynberg Parties U * <.. clam^ .ii yuesim II, In
fact, in Questar II, Questar filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence on the Giynberg
Parties' BTU claims because, according to Questar, the BTU claims were larger than it
previously anticipated.

question is whether the Plaintiffs re-filed within the savings
period.
See Questar's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Default Judgment, Consent to
Enlargement of Plaintiffs' Response Time, and Reply in Support of Motion for Protective
Order (R 731-41) (emphasis added) (Addendum Ex. W). In light of this admission, it is
remarkable that Questar even continues to argue that the BTU claims were not previously
alleged in Questar II.
5.

Judge Johnson Never Found That no BTU Claim was Alleged in
Questar II

In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, Judge Hanson put in a footnote his
conclusion that relation back did not apply to this case because "the plaintiffs' current
BTU claims had never been pled [in Questar 77]." Memorandum Decision at 8, n.4; see
also S.J. Order,fflf9 and 13. Judge Hanson's observation relies upon Questar's
interpretation of an oral comment by Judge Johnson on March 1, 1994 even though such
interpretation is directly contrary to Judge Johnson's written orders, the Amended
Counterclaim in Questar //(Addendum Ex. H) and Questar's own admissions. A review
of the facts demonstrates that the Grynberg Parties did plead BTU claims in Questar II
and Questar's reading of Judge Johnson's off-hand comment cannot change the essential
facts.
Shortly before trial in Questar II, Questar filed a Motion in Limine seeking to
prevent BTU adjustment evidence from being introduced at trial claiming the evidence
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did 111JI iildtt in J ilami in dm ( i n n b e i ^ plcadinu,. In Imnl nl India Hanson, ijik 1 Xm
argued that Fudge J ohnson "r i iled from the bench that he would grant Questar's Motion in
Limine." J udge Johnson, however, did not grant Questar's Motion. Instead, Judge
Johnson orally announced "that I would construct a dismissal in this case w i t h o u t
p r e j u d i c e to allow that action to be separately pled and ruled up<.: / \ ....

1998, after a four and one-half year delay, Judge Johnson signed a written order not
granting a Motion in Limine bn! dismissing the B T U claims without prejudice
Ex. 2/ I at 3
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/ *;inference, as j u e s t a r recognizes, is materia.
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tin nil prejudice" dismisses claims

that were included in the pleading for the express purpose of allowing them to be
separately litigated. Questar's Motion in Limine was never granted.
Questar compounded * - error before Juuge i iaii:v. ;i by repeated]
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Judge Johnson's ambiguous oral statement that never made it into his order. Judge
Johnson's oral comment follows:
T H E C O U R T : Yes. I "he final matter that - well, not final
matter — but another matter that w e considered last night, and
I indicated a preliminary ruling, and [Questar] had reserved
the opportunity to speak to his client concerning that matter,
is the assertion of a claim based upon the B T U content o! the
natural gas over a lengthy period of time. There is n o ^ : -what appears to be a claim, although it is not one that ha
ever made the pleadings, but is represented in correspondence
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at this point between Mr. Walker and Mr. Grynberg, as to
what can be litigated in this case — mainly letters to Mr.
Walker from Mr. Grynberg, I think is primarily what I'm
seeing - but anyway, representing that it was agreed that
there might be an issue concerning the BTU content. And
then there was a motion filed seeking dismissal, I believe,
with prejudice, of that claim on the part of the plaintiff.
Questar's attempt to construe Judge Johnson's comments into a finding "that the BTU
claims had never made the pleadings" reads far more into the judge's cryptic comment
than is justified and is inconsistent with his written order. Judge Johnson dismissed the
BTU claims without prejudice. There is no basis to "dismiss" the BTU claims if they
did not "make the pleadings" because there would be nothing to dismiss. Judge
Johnson's oral comments are not a ruling or finding and are ambiguous. First, Judge
Johnson describes the BTU claims as "the assertion of a claim based upon the BTU
content of the natural gas over a lengthy period of time." He then mentions "a claim,"
without identifying it as a BTU claim, that did not make the pleadings. The reference to
"the claim" that did not make the pleadings could just as easily be understood as a claim
"as to what can be litigated in this case." See lines 8-12 of the transcript of Judge
Johnson's oral ruling.
Questar's assertion that Judge Johnson found "the BTU claim" never made the
pleadings is inconsistent with the Grynberg Parties' Amended Counterclaim which
alleged as follows:
14. [Questar] paid for gas purchased from the [Grynberg
Parties'] using incorrect btu adjustments.
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And, sought damages:
1. . . . in an amount equal to the difference between the y , provided by the agreements and the price actually paid . . .
Q. Ex. 13, % 1,4 and. Prayer ]'[ 1 It is inconsistent with Judge J ohnson's contemporaneous
oral statement that he "would construct a dismissal in this case without prejudice to
allow Ill-ill iii, I M HI ni In li • sqiaiiik'l plcil .iiiiiiiull mini up /HI II (In1 ( 'IHIII " i\'ev U IK, I I' | Il I,
In. 23 - p. 15, In. 1, and is inconsistent with Judge Johnson's written order made over four
years later in which he dismissed "the BTU claims" "without prejudice" (emphasis
added).

not understood when the amended counterclaim was first filed. Through discovery,
discussions and additional analysis the BTU adjustment claim was clarified. Before trial
in Questar II, QuestarmoveG i.- mium. %
i m»u iuv
U - !
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instead biiurcuted the claim allowing for a new pleading and separate trial. The B x L
claims that were included in the dismissed pleading was that Questar used "incorrect
Bi

idjustments," which are the same _;;;.i:. ,d issue in this case. I he court eve ,

dismissed the Gry nberg Parties' B I I J claims withoi it preji idice I he Grynber*

V
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filed this action within the one year and therefore the Grynberg Parties' BTU tort claims
are timely before this Court under Utah's savings statute.

III. THE GRYNBERG PARTIES1 TORT CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE
CONTRACTS.
In the First Amended Complaint, the Grynberg Parties have alleged facts arising
from the same wrongful BTU adjustment scheme which give rise to seven independent
tort claims. As argued above, the economic loss doctrine has no application to the tort
claims asserted during periods when Questar argues the parties had no contractual
relationship. Moreover, with respect to time frames when the parties did have a
contractual relationship, these tort claims are not barred by the economic loss rule for
several reasons. First, the economic loss rule does not bar intentional tort claims.
Second, the negligent misrepresentation claim is based not upon contractual duty, but
upon the independent common law duty requiring a party to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating information on which other parties rely.
Finally, the negligence claim arises from Questar's enhanced duties as a common carrier
and the operator of the gas gathering system in addition to its contractual duties.
Accordingly, all of the tort claims are independent of the contract claims and therefore
are not barred by the economic loss rule.
A.

The Grynberg Partiesy Intentional Tort Claims are not Barred by the
Economic Loss Rule.

The intentional tort claims, conversion, fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of
fiduciary duty and intentional misrepresentation, are not barred by the economic loss
rule. It is well settled that the economic loss rule applies only to tort claims based on
66

Ifn' I 11 1"" ul I'!M11!' , 1161-64 11 ''olo ,M)l II111 Ihe economic loss n lie has nc application to
fraud, negligent misrepresentation or other claims where tort law imposes an independent
duty of care); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 107Q. 108" ttV\
fraud is exception to econon lie loss rule);, inters u. ... ..

1
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(recognizing that

- • . . * . . . . - . . <.c. i CO !

apply to intentional torts, e.g., fraud, business disparagement, intentional interference
with contract, etc.). Judge Hanson acknowledged that "[fjraud, misrepresentation, and

andMemorandi im Decision at 9) bi it he refi lsed to give effect to these exceptions
because he incorrectly found that the tort claims are untimely as a result of his refusal to
apply the appropriate savings statute.20 Consequently, the law of Wyoming, Utah and

l9

Although Wyoming law applies to the Contracts and Colorado law applies to the
219 Contract, no choice of law analysis is required because Wyoming, Colorado and
Utah law all recognize that the economic loss rule does not apply to intentional torts,
such as fraud and conversion
2i)

See supra Section II. In addition, to the extent Judge Hanson's rulings can be
read to mean that notice of wrongful analysis in 1995 somehow insulated Questar from
liability for future intentional torts thereafter committed, that ruling is manifestly wrong.
Such a ruling is contrary to Questar's admission that tort claims three or four years prior
to this Complaint are timely. See Defendants' Opening Memo at 87; see also Simons v.
Laramie County School Dist No. One, 741 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wyo. 1987) ("[a] cause of
action does not accrue until all of the elements , . . are present. If a party seeking relief
has not yet been damaged, an action is premature.") (citations omitted).
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torts simply because the parties had a contractual relationship. That ruling is consistent
with the law in the majority of other jurisdictions. See East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2299-2304 (1986)
(economic loss rule is majority position that one may not recover economic losses under
a theory of non-intentional tort).21
The right to pursue recovery for intentional torts committed by one party to a
contract, after the contract has been entered into, is recognized in many contexts but the
need for such a remedy is paramount when a pipeline company or operator abuses the
rights of owners of natural resources. For example, Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Delhi
Gas Pipeline Corp., 700 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) presents virtually identical
facts to those alleged by the Grynberg Parties. In Dehli Gas the defendant pipeline
company entered into a contract to purchase gas from mineral interest owners and
pursuant to the contract agreed to operate the metering equipment that measured the
volume of gas purchased. The evidence showed that the pipeline company installed a

21

While Questar agrees that the UCC gives special impact to its economic loss
arguments, the UCC "does not, and was never intended to, eliminate and restrict common
law fraud and misrepresentation claims." The Economic Loss Doctrine And Common
Law Fraud, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 875, 876 (1999). The UCC expressly provides that
ff
[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including . . . the law relevant to . . . fraud, misrepresentation . . . or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 34.1-1-103. "Far from being displaced or limited by the U.C.C., there are several
sections within the Code that affirmatively underscore the coexistence of common law
fraud rights and remedies." The Economic Loss Doctrine And Common Law Fraud, 84
Iowa L. Rev. at 880.
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mismeasurement of the actual gas taken. The interest owners asserted claims for
"negligence, res ipsa loquitur, conversion and breach of contract." Id. at 1025. The
pipeline company argued, as Questar does here, that the interest owners' sole remedy was
in IIIIIMKI diid III! u lull puinlh i illaiiia^ts i I ii ni I 11 mil hi i\\ di tied, 1 In1 * nniii! ie|eikjd
both arguments, finding that the evidence supported the claim that the pipeline company
had "intentionally taken plaintiffs' gas" and therefore the plaintiff could pursue recovery
in contract and tort, .-,. e 028.

Tenth Circuit upheld a jury verdict for fraud and deceit (including punitive damages)
based upon Conoco's intentional misconduct in paying ten cents per MMBTU less than
the contract pm*

. onoco achieved its fraud by offsetting, without a contract right,
.:

i

*

\- - rchaser and ti: anspoi ter of the ga s I he ' I ei ith •

Circuit upheld the entire verdict, including punitive damages, holding that although the
"parties' relationship basically is contractual

the breaching party's acts constitute fan

indepenccni. wwiiwi , -e

Zeniti; * >•> .«„•,, i ^rp. \ Internorth, If ic ,
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N.W.2d 493, 501-02 (S.D. 1997) (upholding jury verdict including punitive damages
based upon operator's intentional deceit in making misrepresentations to oil and gas
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interest owners that resulted in the interest holders paying excessive nonconsent
penalties).22
The Wyoming Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly recognized that an owner of
oil and gas interests can simultaneously pursue tort recovery for conversion and breach
of contract recovery in circumstances where the contracts comprehensively establish the
parties' legal relationships. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee P'ship Co., 2 P.3d 534,
542-43 (Wyo. 2000) (royalty owner could recover based upon conversion theory against

22

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Braswell v. Conagra, Inc., 936 F.2d 1169
(1 lth Cir. 1991) likewise presents analogous facts. In Braswell, the defendant contracted
with plaintiff to buy broiler chickens and to pay the plaintiff according to the weight of
the chickens. Id. at 1172-74. The defendant misweighed the chickens and represented
that the false weights were accurate. Id. Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and
fraud. The defendant asserted that it had merely breached the contract to pay the plaintiff
based on the weight of the chickens and the facts did not give rise to an independent
fraud claim. Id. The court rejected the defendant's assertion of the economic loss rule to
bar the plaintiffs fraud claim, noting that because of defendant's fraud, the plaintiff
accepted lower payments than called for under their contracts. Id. at 1173. Accordingly,
the court concluded that the trial court properly presented both breach of contract and
fraud to the jury. Id; see also Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 747 F.2d 1217,
1225 (8th Cir. 1984) (manufacturer intentionally paid inventor less than inventor was
entitled under contract and court held inventor's fraud claim not barred by economic loss
rule); Freedman v. Pearlmany 706 N.Y.S.2d 407, 408 (N.Y.A.D. 2000) (finding plaintiff
stated cause of action for fraud sufficiently independent of cause of action for breach of
contract based on allegation that defendants deliberately concealed and undercounted
share of income plaintiff was entitled to by contract); Pershing Indus., Inc. v. Estate of
Sam, 740 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (plaintiffs conversion claim is
independent tort that falls outside scope of breach of contract claim and is not barred by
economic loss rule); Palco Linings, Inc. v. Pavex, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1269, 1273-75
(M.D. Pa. 1990) (claim for intentional misrepresentation not barred by economic loss
rule); Douglas-Hanson Co. v. BF Goodrich Co., 598 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999), affd 607 N.W.2d 621 (Wis. 2000) (same); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank
Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (111. 1982) (same).
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working interest owner for conversion based upon nonoperator's activities that drained
area of hydrocarbons in breach of unit agreement); Ferguson v. Coronado Oil Co,, 884

sue operator for conversion); and Young i 1 Tow ? g, 709 P 2d 1 254 , 1 257 (Wyo 1/985)
(ex-wife who obtained royalty interest pursuant to divorce decree could sue ex-husband
for conversion). The rationale for recognizing tort recovery is that while the contract

a c t s o c c u r af|er

th e contract is signed:

Where the transaction complained of has its origin in a contract
which places the parties in such a relation that in attempting to
perform the promised service the tort was committed, the breach of
contract is not the gravamen of the action. The contract in such case
is mere inducement, creating the state of things which furnishes the
occasion of the tort, and in all such cases the remedy is an «ni™
delicto, and not an action ex contractu.
Ferguson, 884 P.2d at 978 (quoting 17 A Am.Jur.2d Contract §732 (1991)).
The reason the economic loss rule does not apply to intentional torts is because the

obligation exists independent of any contract. The duty not to lie, deceive or take
another's property is outside the contract and is within "that wider range of legal duty
which is due from every man to his fellow , to respect his rights of property and person,
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and refrain from invading them by force or fraud." Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas
Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 501 (S.D. 1997) (citing Smith v. Weber, 16 N.W.2d 537, 538
(S.D. 1944)). The majority of courts recognize that a contrary rule would encourage and
condone fraudulent behavior. See Brody v. Bock 897 P.2d 769, 776 (Colo. 1995)
(barring plaintiffs fraud claim because it is based on substance of contract claim would
encourage and condone fraudulent behavior). If intentional torts were not carved out of
the economic loss rule, a defrauding defendant would have everything to gain and
nothing to lose. If the defendant is not caught in his fraudulent scheme, then he is able to
retain the resulting dishonest benefits. If he is caught, he has only to pay back that which
he should have paid in the first place. As the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized,
such a rule would give a party to a contract a license to steal and defraud with nothing to
lose but to require the defendant to pay that which the contract required him to pay in the
first place. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 809 (N.C. 1976).
Questar cites cases which are immediately distinguishable by the simple fact that
they all deal solely with a claim for negligence arising out of the parties' contractual
relationship. For example, Questar relies on Schuler v. Community First Nat'l Bank, 999
P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Wyo. 2000) to support its argument that there is no independent
basis for the Grynberg Parties' tort claims. However, Schuler deals only with a claim of
negligence. Moreover, in Schuler, the plaintiff admits that the defendant's duty "arose in
the contractual relationship." Questar's other primary cases are distinguishable on the
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same ground. S ee Rissle? & /! icMurry Co, i< • Sheridan Area W dter Supply Joint Powers

negligent misrepresentation); Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Int'l Order oj Odd Fellows,
526 P.2d 52, 58 (Wyo. 1974) (only tort claim asserted was negligence).
Questar also cites W aiers v 7 renckmann, 503 I > 2d 118 5 ( W y o 1.9 72) for the

parties have no remedies outside of contract no matter how egregious an intentional
fraud QuestarV "license to steal" argument is not supported by Waters or by any public
" r t oo r appi\ the
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punitive damages because the plaintiff failed to present anything "in the record to
indicate the jury found Waters guilty of fraud." Id. at 1190, While the plaintiff claimed
misrepresentations were made to induce the purchase oi a ranc. ;..*. i ... ^uhd lai ;he
recoi ;:! sho w • eel no fi ai id c nh • 1:11111 111c
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down payment they couldn't afford. Id. Fhe Court's holding is simply that absent
"fraud," or evidence of "spite, ill will or willful or wanton misconduct," punitive

wrongful acts occurring afterwards would be compensatory damages for breach of
contract" must be read in context. The only fraud alleged in Waters related to
inducement to enter the contract and consequently all other complaints made by the
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plaintiff in that case (i.e. alleged breaches of contract and warranty) were contractual in
nature since the misrepresentations occurred previously.
Moreover, according to Questar's reading of Waters, contract and tort claims can
never co-exist in Wyoming, even if the separate elements of contract and tort law are
found to exist. Case law subsequent to Waters and Waters itself demonstrates that such a
reading is incorrect. For example, in Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Ins.
Co., Inc., 707 P.2d 161, 164 (Wyo. 1985) the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
Punitive damages are generally not recoverable in an action upon a
contract... [but] may be recoverable in an action in tort if the
conduct constituting the breach rises to the level of an independent
tort.
Id. at 164. In Reynolds v. Tice, 595 P.2d 1318 (Wyo. 1979) the Wyoming Supreme
Court recognized that a fraud claim and a contract claim can co-exist even if based upon
"the same alleged misrepresentations [because] [t]he elements of the two claims are
different." Id. at 1322. As discussed above, the Wyoming Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that an owner of natural resources can pursue recovery for conversion and breach of
contract even though the parties' relationship springs from a contract. See Amoco, 2 P.3d
at 542-43; ANR9 893 P.2d at 701 and 704; and Ferguson, 884 P.2d at 977. In Waters
itself the Wyoming Supreme Court "call[ed] attention" to and relied upon Continental
Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 489 P.2d 15,19 (Ariz. 1971) wherein a conversion and breach of
contract claim were both submitted to a jury. See Waters, 503 P.2d at 1191. The Waters
Court acknowledged that while a plaintiff can pursue recovery for both conversion and
74

"ill will or willful and wanton misconduct." Id.

. .

In this case, the intentional tort claims are not barred by the economic loss rule as
a matter of law, Questar had duties to the Grynberg Parties that arose outside the

other's property, Questar did not have free reign to defrai id merely becai ise Qi lestar also
had a contract. ' Hius, the Grynberg Parties have alleged facts demonstrating that Questar
is liable for conversion, fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of fiduciary duty and

B.

I he G r y n b e r g Parties' Negligent Misrepi esentation Claim, is not
Barred by the Economic Loss Rule.

The Grynberg Parties' negligent misrepresentation claim is also independent from
theii • ::oi: ltract claims and is not barred by the economic loss r ^ . A negligent
misrepresen* '
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principles •
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. - \y principle of

contract law, is available to a parly to a contract. Brubaker, 526 P.2d at 58; Town of
Alma, 10 P.2d at 1263; see also PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James & Assoc, 690
Si:),2d 1 296 (Fla 199 7) (economic loss i i lie does not elii i linate claims for negligent
misrepresentation); State byBronster

v. U.S. Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294 (Haw. 1996)

(same); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco IIProd. Liab Litig., 1995 WL 714441 (E.D. La.
Dec.

(same).
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For example, in Town of Alma, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that
"negligent misrepresentation is a tort claim based 'not on principles of contractual
obligation but on principles of duty and reasonable conduct."' 10 P.3d at 1263 (quoting
Keller v. A.O. Smith Harrestone Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1991)). Since this
duty is "independent of any contractual obligations, the economic loss rule has no
application and does not bar a plaintiffs tort claim because the claim is based on a
recognized independent duty of care and thus does not fall within the scope of the rule."
Id. (emphasis in original).
In this case, the Grynberg Parties have alleged that Questar negligently (or
intentionally) "misrepresented the gas measurements and wrongful analysis to Plaintiffs
in each payment and statement of heat content and, negligently or intentionally,
concealed the mismeasurement from Plaintiffs." Thus undervaluing each monthly
payment for each gas well. First Amended Complaint, \ 82. The Grynberg Parties'
negligent misrepresentation claim is based upon the independent common law duty
requiring Questar to exercise reasonable care and competence in measuring and
providing accurate and truthful payments and statements of heating content to sellers and
shippers upon which they rely. See also Grynberg, et al v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp.,
573 N.W.2d 493, 501 (S.D. 1997) (duty not to lie and duty not to misrepresent facts with
intent to deceive another person are duties imposed by the common law whether or not a
contract exists).
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Ihe Grynberg Parties 1 Negligence Claim is not Barred by the
Economic Loss Rule.
The Grynberg Parties' negligence claim is a: •* f: .ienon-ricni of ih: n;nih ;'
contractual relationship and arises from Questar's enhanced duties to the Grynberg
Parties as a common carrier and based upon the special nature of Questar's

established in Wyoming that a contract may create a relationship from which arises die
duty to exercise proper care and acts and omissions in performance may give rise to a tort
liability. Brubaker, 526 P.2d at 58. In Town of Alma the Colorado Supreme Court

an independent duty of care that siipports a tort action even when the parties have entered
into a contractual relationship " 10 P.3d at ] 263. Examples include relationships of a
"quasi-fiduciary nature." Id.

imposed upon Questar as a common carrier and as the party with the responsibility to
gather., measure and transport gas from the Nitchie Gulch area. Questar's duties are
fiduciary in nature given that w .N m a superior position to assure the accuracy c ; \. *

carrier, Questar also owes enhanced duties of care. See New York Cent R.R. Co. v.
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Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 377, 21 L.Ed. 627 (1873) (common carriers owe the utmost care
and diligence in the performance of their duties).23
In addition, courts have long recognized the "special relationship" that exists
between operators of oil and gas wells and the interest owners upon whose behalf the
minerals are extracted, gathered and transported. See E. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of
Oil and Gas, § 59.1 at 105-06 (1991) (an operator has a "duty of diligent and proper
operation [that] is a broad duty to perform operations such as the testing . . . of wells"
and this duty applies to "the manner in which all operations must be conducted.")
(hereinafter "Kuntz"); P. Martin & B. Kramer, Williams & Meyers Oil & Gas Law,
§ 861.1 at 425 (2000) ("It is generally agreed that the lessee must conduct operations on
the leasehold with due care") (hereinafter "Williams & Meyers"). The obligation exists
because of the inherent conflict of interest that exists between mineral owners and the
operators who extract, gather and transport the owners1 gas. Kuntz § 59.1 at 105.

23

Without regard to FERC orders, Questar is a common carrier. A common carrier
is one who, "by virtue of his business or calling or holding out, undertakes for
compensating to transport persons or property, or both, from one place to another for all
such as may choose to employ him." State v. Nelson, 238 P. 237, 239 (Utah 1925).
During the period Questar transported the Grynberg Parties' gas both in its gathering
system and in its pipeline, it was transporting a product owned by others. At all times it
undertook the obligation to accurately measure volumes and determine heating content.
Moreover, whether business conducted by a pipeline company is actually that of a
common carrier is a question of fact and, therefore, not the appropriate subject of a
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. China-Nome Gas Co., Inc. v.
Riddle, 541 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. App. 1976).
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While Questar did not extract the minerals in the Nitchie Gulch unit, it did act as
the gathering and transporting operator at all relevant times. Consequently, when
Questar measured the gas it purchased as the gathering systems operator, it had a clear
conflict of interest giving rise to a "prudent operator standard." See Williams & Meyers,
§861.1 at 427 (citing Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Delhi Pipeline Corp., 700 P.2d 1023
(Okla. App. 1983)).24 Questar's product operator duty is separate from and in addition to
the parties' contractual duties. See Kuntz, § 59.1 at 106; Williams & Meyers, § 861.1 at
425. This "special relationship" duty of care is precisely the type of independent duty
that does not give way to the economic loss doctrine. See, e.g., Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at
1263 (listing examples).
In Woods Petroleum the Court applied these established principles to a pipeline
company within indistinguishable facts. The Court found that when a pipeline company
assumes responsibility to measure and transport the gas it purchases, this type of contract
creates a special "common law duty" to "measure the gas . . . with care, skill, reasonable
expediency and faithfulness." 700 P.2d at 1027. When failing to do so, the pipeline
company "breach[es] the contract and also commit[s] a tort." Id. Accordingly, the
Grynberg Parties have stated a negligence claim not barred by the economic loss rule.

24

The Grynberg Parties' acknowledge that Questar did not purchase gas for all
periods. When it did not purchase, however, it unquestionably served as a common
carrier. Moreover, even when Questar stopped purchasing, it had a large incentive to
conceal its prior fraud by continuing its established techniques used to incorrectly
analyze BTU.
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IV.

THE GRYNBERG PARTIES' CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE TIMELY.
As argued above, the Grynberg Parties' contract claims are unquestionably timely

for all periods four years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit, assuming that the
contracts continued in force after July 1, 1994. That issue will be resolved in Questar III.
In addition, the Grynberg Parties' other contract claims are timely for the following
reasons: (a) the six month savings statute in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3) does not
"trump" Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 and in all events the six month period began on
March 20, 2000 when the Questar //Final Judgment was entered making all contract
claims timely; (b) pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-119 Questar's payments accrue the
statute of limitations anew; and (c) the statute of limitations did not accrue for contract
payments of $7.1 million made in 2000 and 2001 using incorrect BTU adjustments until
those payments were made.
A.

UCCys Six Month Savings Statute Does not Bar the Grynberg Parties1
Contract Claims.

Questar argues that instead of the one-year savings statute, Utah's six-month UCC
savings clause should apply and bar all the Grynberg Parties1 tort and contract claims. As
argued above, the UCC savings provision does not apply to the Grynberg Parties' tort
claims. Moreover, as demonstrated below, the UCC savings clause is not a bar for three
reasons. First, Utah's UCC savings clause does not apply because it only revives an
entire action that is dismissed. Instead, because the Grynberg Parties are reviving only
an individual claim or specific cause of action instead of an entire lawsuit, the one-year
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savings statute is applicable. Second, when two statutes of limitations potentially apply,
courts should apply the longer statute of limitation. Third, even if applied, the six month
period did not start until entry of the Questar //Final Judgment on March 20, 2000 and
all claims were timely filed.
/.

The Utah UCC Savings Statute Does Not Apply to the Dismissed
BTU Claim.

The Utah UCC savings clause does not apply to the BTU claims, therefore, the
one-year savings statute applies. In interpreting these two statutes, the court is guided by
certain rules of statutory construction. First, the primary rule guiding statutory
interpretations is that the court "give effect to the intent of the legislature." Johnson v.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake County., 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1996). To
discover that intent, courts "first look to the plain language of the statute." Id. Finally,
courts "presume that the Legislature used each word advisedly, and [courts] give effect to
each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Utah State Bar v.
Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995). Therefore, the plain language
of both the UCC and the general one-year savings statutes are analyzed to show that only
the one-year savings statute is applicable.
The UCC savings clause only applies to revive an action, or lawsuit that is
dismissed, but by its terms does not apply to revive single dismissed claims, like the BTU
claims. The Utah UCC savings statute provides, "Where an action commenced . . . is so
Ic i minuted as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such
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other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six
months after the termination of the first action." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3)
(emphasis added). The use of the word "action" in the UCC statute means that the entire
lawsuit would have to be dismissed before the statutory period would begin to run. See
Utah Code Ann. § 70 A-1-201(1) ("'action* in the sense of a judicial proceeding includes
recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in equity, and any other proceedings in which
rights are determined"); Black's Law Dictionary 28 (6th ed. 1990) ("term [action] in its
usual sense means a lawsuit brought in a court"). In the instant case, however, only one
claim was dismissed, and not an entire action.
In contrast, the Utah general one-year savings statute provides, "If any action is
commenced within due time and . . . the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff... may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (emphasis
added). Reading these clauses together, it is clear that the one-year savings statute is not
limited to reviving only actions that are dismissed, but also to any individual claim that is
dismissed. Because the UCC six-month savings clause does not apply to revive an
individual claim that is dismissed, it does not apply and the one-year savings statute was
properly applied to revive this individual claim.
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2.

The Longer One-year Savings Statute Should be Applied, Over the
Six-month Savings Clause, if the Court Finds That There is any
Doubt as to the Application of Either Statute of Limitations.

In any event, the wording of the one-year savings statute and the six-month
savings clause creates confusion and doubt, and the longer one-year savings statute
should therefore apply. When faced with two different statutes of limitation which can
both be applied, any "doubt should be resolved in favor of the application of the statute
containing the longest limitation." Cathco v. Valentiner Crane Brunjies Onyon
Architects, 944 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah 1997); Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d
320, 323, 266 P.2d 494, 496 (1954); see also 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions § 63
(1970). Therefore, the doubt as to which savings statute should apply should be resolved
by applying the longer one-year savings statute.25
3.

The Six-Month Period Began on March 20, 2000.

The UCC savings statute states that the period to refile a previously commenced
action ends "six months after the termination of the first action." Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-725(3). In this case, Questar //was not terminated until March 20, 2000 when

25

Questar argues that the UCC savings clause is a mandatory requirement that
precludes the application of the one-year savings statute. Yet the savings clause only
states that a party may refile its claim within six months after termination of its first
action. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(c) (1999). Within the UCC statute of
limitations, the only mandatory portion is the requirement that breach of a sales contract
actions must be filed within four (4) years. See Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725(a) (1999).
Therefore, even if there is ambiguity between the applicability of both statutes of
limitations, the non-mandatory, six-month savings clause should yield, and the one-year
savings statute should be applied.
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Judge Johnson entered the Questar //Final Judgment. Consequently, all contract claims
asserted in Questar II could be refiled at any time prior to September 21, 2000. By
refiling the contract claims on September 29, 1999-almost a year earlier-those claims
were clearly asserted in time.
Despite these straightforward facts, Questar argued, and the trial court found, that
the six month period referenced in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3) began to run on
October 1, 1998 when in Questar II "related claims terminated . . . with no appeal of
relevant claims." See S.J. Order ^f 8 (emphasis added). By selecting October 1, 1998,
rather than March 20, 2000, as the date that the Questar II "action" was finally
"terminated," the trial court committed error.
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) this Court was called upon to
determine whether the period provided in a savings statute runs from the date of the trial
court's order or from the time that the first lawsuit is finally resolved by the appellate
courts. This Court held that it would defeat a fundamental purpose of the savings statute
to find that the time for recommencing an action runs from any date other than final
resolution by a court of appeals. This Court stated:
One purpose of section 78-12-40 is to assure that claimants are not
deprived of potentially valid suits by appeals that are not resolved
until after the applicable periods of limitation run. In accordance
with that purpose, we have held that if dismissal of the first action is
appealed, section 78-12-40fs extension of time for filing a second
action runs from the date of the dismissal's affirmance.
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Id. at 254 (citing Guthiel v. Gilmer, 27 Utah 496, 508, 76 P. 628, 632 (1904)). While
Madsen dealt with the general savings statute rather than the UCC savings statute, the
underlying rationale is the same. The UCC savings period begins when the "action"
"terminates," (Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3)) and the period in the general savings
statute begins when the "action" or "cause of action" "fails." Utah Code Ann. § 78-1240.
In this case, Judge Johnson's interlocutory dismissal of the BTU claims on
October 1, 1998 neither terminated Questar II, nor resulted in a failure of that action.
While the Order of Dismissal did facilitate Rule 54(b) certification of issues that had
been tried to the jury, it clearly did not result in a "termination" of any "action."
Moreover, this Court in Madsen recognized the important policies behind interpreting
the savings statute in a way where a party is not forced to choose between filing a second
lawsuit or pursuing an appeal. This decision is in accord with the opinion of an
overwhelming majority of courts interpreting savings statutes. See Grider v. USX Corp.,
847 P.2d 779, 784 (Okla. 1993) ("an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions agree with
Kansas and the Tenth Circuit that the time of commencement of the savings provisions is
the date the judgment is decided on appeal, not the date of determination in the trial
court"); Hollister v. Forsythe, 889 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Mont. 1995) ("use of the word
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'termination1 refers to the ultimate termination which occurs after final appellate
action").26
The Montana Supreme Court's analysis is particularly important because the Court
recognized that "use of the word 'termination1 [within a savings statute] refers to the
ultimate termination which occurs after final appellate action." Hollister, 889 P.2d at
1207; see also Buchholz v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 269 A.D. 49, 50 (N.Y. App. Div.
1945) ("termination [for savings statute purposes] was the decision of the court of
appeals (or entry of judgment on remittitur) in the earlier action"); and Glass v. Basin &
Bay State Mining Co., 85 P. 746, 747 (Mont. 1906) ("termination" of a former action for
savings statute purposes occurs upon affirmation on appeal).
The trial court apparently based its determination that October 1, 1998 was the
relevant date upon the assertion that there was "no appeal of relevant claims." See S.J.
Order, | 8 at 4. The fact that Judge Johnson entered an order dismissing the BTU claims

26

See also Gosnell v. Whetsel, 198 A.2d 924, 926 (Del 1964) ("it has been held in
an overwhelming majority of cases that the time limited for the recommencement of an
action is to be measured from the date of the affirmance on appeal of a judgment or
decision"); Adams v. Sullivan, 261 A.2d 273, 275 (N.H. 1970) (agreeing with
"overwhelming majority of cases" that savings statute should begin to run from the date
of affirmance on appeal); Ockerman v. Wise, 21A S.W.2d 385, 387 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955)
(for savings statute purposes the relevant period runs from the appellate court's ruling if
there is an appeal); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Randolph, 55 S.E. 47, 50 (Ga. 1906) (the
ruling of the statute is suspended during the pendency of a valid writ of error); Pattridge
v. Lott, 15 Mich. 251 (Mich. 1867) (time for further suit ran from dismissal of appeal);
New v. Smith, 119 P. 380, 382 (Kan. 1911) (plaintiff had one year from affirmation of
dismissal on appeal to file a new action).
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without prejudice at the same time he provisionally granted a new trial and certified for
appeal certain claims, is irrelevant since the period in the savings statute runs from the
date of "termination of the first action." See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725(3). In Grider
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected the same argument Questar now makes. In
Grider, the plaintiff filed a claim in federal court asserting a RICO claim and pendant
state law claims. The federal court dismissed the RICO claim on substantive grounds
and because the federal claim was dismissed, the pendant state law claims were also
dismissed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal and thereafter the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari. The defendants in Grider argued that because the
plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of the pendant state law claims, the savings statute
began to run from the date of the trial court's dismissal of those "claims," rather than
from the date that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari and the "action" terminated.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state and federal claims would be
treated the same and the operative date was when the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari, refusing to hear the merits related to dismissal of the RICO claim. Grider,
847 P.2d at 784-85. The Court stated that "[t]he key to understanding [the savings
statute] is the v m l 'action.1

an 'action' includes the initial judgment

and any validly filed appeals that suspend the finality of the judgment." Id. at 784
(emphasis added). The Court further rejected all arguments that the state law claims had
been abandoned noting that the plaintiffs "entire cause of action was based on the series
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of transactions in which he was allegedly deprived of proceeds from oil operations." Id.
at 785.
Grynbergfs BTU claims likewise cannot be treated any differently from the
remainder of their "action."27 This is especially true since savings statutes are remedial
and are to be construed liberally in favor of having claims decided on the merits. See
supra Section III.B.l. The trial court's reading of "action" is contrary to the statutory
language and it violates the remedial nature of savings provisions by placing the
Grynberg Parties in the position of having to foresee that the trial court would read
"action" to mean "claim" within the uniquely complex procedural facts of Questar II.
Such a position is unfair and contrary to the policy of the statute, especially because the
Grynberg Parties did not invite this procedural complexity. They were prepared to go to
trial on the BTU claims in Questar II.

27

The Montana Supreme Court appears to have reached the same result in
Hollister v. Forsythe, 889 P.2d 1205 (Mont. 1995). In Hollister, the plaintiff brought a
lawsuit in federal court asserting federal and pendant state law claims. Id. at 1206. The
trial court granted summary judgment on the federal claim and exercised its discretion
not to entertain the pendant state law claims. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 954
(9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Id. In evaluating these facts, the Supreme Court of Montana refused to treat the state and
federal claims any differently despite the fact that the appeal before the Ninth Circuit
addressed only the substance of the federal claims. See Hollister, 889 P.2d at 1207
(recognizing that the plaintiff could file a new lawsuit in connection with the state law
claims under the savings statute); Hollister, 22 F.3d at 951-54 (substantively addressing
only the plaintiffs federal claims but noting a dismissal of the state law claims).
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B.

Under Wyoming Substantive Law the Date of Questarfs Continuing
Payments for Gas Sold Under the Contracts Determines the Accrual of
a Cause of Action and the Statute of Limitations Has Not Run.

In 2000 and 2001, Questar has paid the Grynberg Parties for gas, compression
charges and other obligations owing under the contracts using an incorrect BTU
adjustment. These payments total more than $7.1 million. In Wyoming, "[w]hen
payment has been made upon any demand founded on contract or a written
acknowledgment thereof, or promise to pay the same has been made and signed by the
party to be charged, the time for commencing an action runs from the date of such
payment, acknowledgment or promise." Wyo. Stat Ann. § 1-3-119 (2001) (emphasis
added.). This statute clearly determines f,the time for commencing an action" and
undisputed facts demonstrate that this action is timely. The accrual of a cause of action is
a question of substantive law governed by the law of Wyoming (the jurisdiction both
sides agree provides the substantive law to the Contracts). See Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries,
355 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) ('"accrual of the cause of action' is properly
characterized as substantive" for choice of law analysis); cf. Financial Bancorp, Inc. v.
Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("a cause of action for a
breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be performed.").
The Grynberg Parties' contract claims continue to accrue with each partial
payment or acknowledgment of a debt, even if an original statute of limitations lapsed.
See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions § 362 (1970) ("[i]t is the general rule that the
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limitation period may be started anew by a part payment which is made either before or
after the original obligation has become barred) (citations omitted).28
Years of unresolved negotiations and litigation between the Grynberg Parties and
Questar regarding the amounts owed under the Contracts have also transformed the
Contracts into an open account. This is particularly true given the absence of a "final
determination" under the Contracts as discussed below. See infra Section IV.C. An
"open account" is generally defined as "an unsettled claim or demand made by the
creditor." Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111,114, 65 S. Ct 157, 159 (1944); see also Black's
Law Dictionary 1090 (6th ed. 1990) (stating an "open account" is "unpaid or unsettled
account; an account with a balance which has not been ascertained, which is kept open in
anticipation of future transactions.") On any open account, the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until final payment is made. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Pearson, 769 F.2d 1471, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985).
Questarfs payments on obligations owing under the Contracts, after this case was
filed were "without any restrictions, limitations or reservations of rights." Grynberg Ex.
5 at p. 1 (Addendum Ex. M). Questar asked that Mr. Grynberg accept the tendered

28

Utah has a similar partial payment statute as Wyoming (Utah Code Ann. § 7812-44), however it has been construed as precluding revival of claims previously
expired. See State Bank o/S Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys. Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995). In any event, such statutes define the accrual of the cause of action and
are thus substantive. Accordingly, the Wyoming statute, rather then the Utah statute,
applies.
90

check for f'the amounts everyone agrees upon while we continue to try to resolve
differences in other amounts." Id. Based on this communication alone, Questar has not
only made a partial payment, but has also acknowledged the unsettled nature of Questar's
remaining debt.
Although the Grynberg Parties argued for application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3119 (1999) (see Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 57-59),
the trial court largely ignored this critical statute, making no reference to it in the Court's
S.J. Order. The Court's Memorandum Decision at 7, n.3, does reference a March 8, 2001
Minute Entry (R 2690-94) (Addendum Ex. X) wherein the court supposedly addressed
the "substance" of this statute. In that Minute Entry the trial court concluded that
Questar's payments "cannot be construed as an acknowledgment of an obligation on the
BTU claims." Minute Entry at 3 (R 2692). The court reasoned that § 1-3-119 is "simply
inapplicable" because Questar's payments were made pursuant to court order and
therefore cannot be "construed as an acknowledgment of the primary claims." Id.
The trial court's analysis ignores the plain language of § 1-3-119. The statute
expressly restarts the limitation period from the date of any "payment, acknowledgment
or promise." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-119 (emphasis added). The trial court's conclusion
that a payment can be disregarded if not accompanied by a written "acknowledgment"
(i.e. is made pursuant to court order) ignores the plain language of the statute. The
statute is written in the disjunctive. "Cannons of construction ordinarily suggest that
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terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates
otherwise." Reiter v. Sonotome Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338, 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2330 (1975).
In light of these rules the trial court clearly read § 1-3-119 incorrectly to require both a
"payment" and a written "acknowledgment." All of the Grynberg Parties1 contract claims
therefore accrued on the date of Questar's last payment, including the $7.1 million of gas
paid for in 2000 and 2001 using incorrect BTU adjustment.
C.

Alternatively, the Statute of Limitations Has Not Started Running
Because no Cause of Action Has Accrued,29

The contract statute of limitations does not begin to run until a cause of action has
accrued. In Wyoming, "[a] cause of action does not accrue until all the elements . . . are
present. If a party seeking relief has not yet been damaged, an action is premature."
Simons v. Laramie County School District No. One, 741 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Wyo. 1987)
(internal citations omitted); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34.1-2-725(b) ("A cause of action accrues
when the breach occurs"). In this case, the Grynberg Parties' contract claim for the
incorrect BTU adjustment related to the $7.1 million of gas paid for by Questar in 2000
and 2001 could not possibly accrue prior to Questar's payments. Prior to that time, no
damage occurred.
In addition, under the unique provisions of the Contracts, there must be a "final
determination of the correct [BTU]" before the contract can be considered to have been

29

If this Court finds that Questar's payments mark the beginning of the running of
the statute of limitations, there is no need to consider this argument.
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breached. See paragraph XV-1 of the Contracts, Q. Exs. 4, 5 and 6. Under the
Contracts, a "final determination" does not occur upon tender of the gas, but only after
the Grynberg Parties report errors and a "final determination" is thereafter made. Id. The
Contracts do not identify the procedure for obtaining such "final determination" and
given the lack of resolution, it is the Grynberg Parties1 position that no "final
determination" has ever taken place. For that reason the Grynberg Parties have requested
that the trial court finally determine correct values to be used in the BTU adjustment
measurements pursuant to the Grynberg Parties1 declaratory judgment claim. See First
Amended Complaint ^ 79-81. Until that determination is made, the contract cause of
action cannot accrue because Questar's obligations arise 30 days after the "final
determination" and a cause of action does not accrue in Wyoming until the cause of
action could have been filed and prosecuted to completion. Gillis v. F&A Enterprises,
934P.2d 1253, 1255 (Wyo. \991)\ DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 858 (Wyo. 1986).
Even if a "final determination" is somehow made without court assistance, at a
minimum, there is a question of fact as to when "final determinations" occurred under the
Contracts for various gas payments including the $7.1 million paid in 2000 and 2001.
See Schelske v. South Dakota Poultry Cooperative, 465 N.W.2d 187, 189 (S.D. 1991)
("[t]he jury [must] determine if the contract was breached, and if so, when the breach
occurred" under UCC 2-725). In Schelske the Court upheld a jury verdict that a breach
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did not occur upon tender of the goods or at the time of a partial payment but instead
much later based upon the terms of the involved contract. Id. at 190.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS EQUITABLE
TOLLING.
The assertion of the BTU claims in Questar //also tolled the applicable statute of

limitations under the equitable tolling doctrine. The trial court erred in failing to address
this doctrine in both its S.J. Order and in its Memorandum Decision. The statute of
limitations is not a defense where equitable principles justify tolling of the statute. Sevy
v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995); Shell Western E&P, Inc. v.
Dolores County Bd. of Comm'rs, 948 P.2d 1002, 1007-08 (Colo. 1997) (en banc);
Erickson v. Croft, 760 P.2d 706, 708 (Mont. 1988); Jones v. Tracy Sch. Dist., 611 P.2d
441, 445-46 (Cal. 1980); Elkins v. Derby 525 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1974); Gudenau & Co. v.
Sweeney Ins. Inc., 136 P.2d 763, 769-70 (Alaska 1987). One such circumstance is when
an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues
one. The doctrine has been summarized as follows:
[C]ourts have adhered to a general policy which favors
relieving plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when,
possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good
faith, pursues one designated to lessen the extent of his
injuries or damage.
Erickson, 760 P.2d at 708 (citing Addison v. State, 578 P.2d 941, 943 (Cal. 1978)).
Courts typically agree that there are three requirements to invoke equitable tolling: (1)
timely notice to the defendant [within the applicable statute of limitations]; (2) lack of
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prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3)
good faith and reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim. Id. The
Grynberg Parties satisfy all three.
The California Supreme Court applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to reverse
dismissal of an action filed in state court because the plaintiff had timely pursued a
concurrent federal remedy which had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction after the
applicable statute of limitations had run. Addison, 578 P.2d at 941. In Addison, the
court reasoned that the equitable tolling doctrine fosters the policy of the law which
favors avoiding forfeitures and allowing good faith litigants their day in court.
Importantly, the court noted that where the plaintiffs filed a claim within the statute of
limitations period, the defendants were fully notified of plaintiff s intent to litigate and
the nature of the claims. Id. In another case, the court unanimously held that the statute
of limitations on a personal injury action is tolled while the plaintiff asserts a workers1
compensation claim against defendant. Elkins, 525 P.2d at 82-83. In Elkins, the Court
reasoned that the defendant can claim no substantial prejudice, having received timely
notice of possible tort liability upon filing of the compensation claim, and having ample
opportunity to gather defense evidence in the event a court action ultimately is filed. Id.;
see also New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346; 43 S. Ct. 122, 123
(1922) (when defendant has had notice from beginning that plaintiff is trying to enforce a
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claim against it, "the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of
opinion that a liberal rule should be applied").
Similarly, in this case, the Grynberg Parties are entitled to an equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations. In 1993, Mr. Grynberg discovered that Questar was
fraudulently or negligently altering the gas stream and/or measurement devices and
procedures in the measurement and analysis of natural gas while representing that its
determinations were accurate. At that time, Questar //was pending before the U.S.
District Court in Wyoming. The Grynberg Parties promptly amended their counterclaim
to assert claims that Questar had paid them based on incorrect BTU adjustments.
Discovery and further work revealed a much more extensive problem than was initially
appreciated. The parties and the court had extensive discussions regarding the Grynberg
Parties' BTU claims and the court, before further pleadings or amendments could be
made, bifurcated the Grynberg Parties' BTU claims "for later determination." See
Statement of Facts *|fl[ 7 to 9. More than four years later, on October 1, 1998, the court
dismissed the BTU claims without prejudice, enabling them to be brought in this action.
Since 1993, Questar was clearly on notice that the Grynberg Parties were asserting
contract and tort claims for Questar's failure to properly determine heating content of the
gas it bought and transported. Thus, as in Elkins, Questar received timely notice of
possible liability for the BTU claim and can claim no prejudice. Also, Questar had ample
notice because of numerous meetings and conversations between Grynberg and Questar
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trying to resolve the wrongful BTU analysis of the gas Questar purchased and
transported.
For these reasons, the Grynberg Parties have met the three elements required for
equitable tolling. First, the BTU claims were timely asserted in July 1993 in Questar II
shortly after they were discovered and within the statute of limitations. Second, in July
1993 and thereafter, Questar was on notice that Grynberg was pursuing claims for
incorrect BTU adjustments and had ample opportunity to gather and preserve evidence
and prepare a defense in the pending action. Through no fault of the Grynberg Parties
the court delayed entering a written order on the dismissal for four and one-half years.
During that time Questar cannot have changed its position. Therefore, Questar can claim
no substantial prejudice. Third, the Grynberg Parties acted in good faith. Soon after
asserting the BTU claims in Questar II, the court severed the claims. The court waited
more than four years before finally dismissing the claims without prejudice. Thereafter,
within the one-yearfs savings statute period, Grynberg filed this suit, alleging, once again,
the BTU claims. Statute of limitations are not designed to be pitfalls and traps, but
instead are supposed to do substantial justice. See Shell Western E &P, Inc. v. Dolores
County Bd. ofComm'rs, 948 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 1997) ("equity may require a tolling
of the statutory period where flexibility is required to accomplish the goals of justice")
(citations omitted). To apply the doctrine of equitable tolling in this case satisfies the
policy underlying the statute of limitations without ignoring the competing policy of
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avoiding technical and unjust forfeitures. Therefore, all causes of action based on
improper BTU adjustments should be equitably tolled.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE CONTRACT 219.
The trial court did not address the Contract 219 in its Memorandum Decision. In

an effort to again "plug a hole" in the trial court's analysis, Questar added a finding in the
Order that "Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
enforceability of that [Contract 219 settlement and release] or of concealment.'1 Order
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ^f 19b at 7. This ruling is one
more example of the court improperly going beyond the pleadings and Questar's
arguments.
In actuality, although Questar put before the court a new contract that the
Grynberg Parties specifically allege was fraudulently induced (see Amended Complaint
lfl[ 73-77), Questar presented no evidence on the claim of fraudulent inducement.
Instead, those allegations were ignored. The Grynberg Parties are clearly entitled to a
trial on their allegations of fraudulent inducement and the trial court could not make
factual findings without first allowing discovery on this issue. See supra Section I.B.2.L
discussing Rule 12(b)(6). Further, the trial court rejected Questar's arguments that the
Grynberg Parties failed to adequately plead fraud and therefore those allegations stand.
See supra note 3.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court must reverse Judge Hanson and order a trial
on all claims asserted by the Grynberg Parties.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2001.
MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW &
BEDNARLLC

Brent V. Manning
Alan C. Bradshaw
Jack M. Morgan
Attorneys for Appellants
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